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I. INTRODUCTION 
The source of income rules used in the United States and elsewhere 
in large part establish the contours of income tax jurisdiction that is exercised 
by countries.! Source rules do this by allocating a taxpayer's income for 
purposes of assigning countries their rights to tax such income.2 Thus, source 
rules are of critical importance in the functioning of the income tax rules that 
apply to cross-border business and investment activities. 
The source rules play a vital role in the foreign tax credit system 
applicable to U.S. persons with foreign investment or business activities. 
This is because a U.S. taxpayer is subject to an annual foreign tax credit 
limitation, which is generally equal to the taxpayer's average U.S. tax rate 
multiplied by the taxpayer's foreign source income as determined under the 
source rules.3 The source rules also playa central role in the United States' 
exercise of taxation over foreign persons with U.S. businesses or 
investments. For the most part, only U.S. source income is subject to tax 
under the U.S. tax regimes that apply to foreign persons.4 Moreover, if the 
United States were to move to a full or partial territorial system for taxing 
U.S. persons, the source rules would assume even greater importance given 
that they would determine whether the United States would impose any tax 
(as opposed to a residual tax) on the income of U.S. persons from cross-
border activities.5 Other countries likewise use source rules or their 
1. See Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An 
Analysis of the u.s. System and Its Economic Premises, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 13 (Assaf Razin & 
Joel Slemrod, eds., 1990) ("The source rules are central to the taxing jurisdiction 
asserted over both U.S. and foreign persons."); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, 
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, "What's Source Got to Do With It?" Source Rules and u.s. 
International Tax, 56 TAX L. REv. 81, 83 (2002) [hereinafter, Shay, Fleming & 
Peroni, Source Rules] (noting that "the concept of 'source' is at the heart of 
international taxation"). 
2. Compare this to the use of the arm's length method for allocating income 
among commonly controlled entities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482. Thus, whereas the 
arm's length method is used to allocate income among taxpayers, the source rules 
are used to allocate income within a particular taxpayer. 
3. See I.R.C. § 904(a), (d). 
4. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b), 881(a), 882(a), 864(c). 
5. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of 
a Proposed u.s. Exemption (Territorial Tax System), 41 TAX NOTES INT'L 217, 
226-227 (2006); cf HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME 
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 447-48 (2010) (pointing out that in countries 
using territorial systems, great pressure is placed on source rules because treating 
income as foreign source may result in the income not being taxed anywhere if 
countries use different source rules). 
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equivalent in applying foreign tax credit or territorial systems to their 
residents and exercising source taxation over nonresidents.6 
The current approach for sourcing income suffers from two related 
problems. First, the source rules lack coherence in that they fail to advance a 
consistent normative tax policy.7 While the U.S. rules are generally based on 
the notion of sourcing income according to the location of economic 
activities that generate the income, they also promote other policy concerns, 
such as taxing income that is not likely to be taxed by foreign countries and 
encouraging U.S. export activities.8 More fundamentally, the source rules 
used by the United States and other countries fail to reflect the consistent 
application of the key principle appropriate for allocating nations' primary 
taxing rights - namely, the benefits principle, under which income should 
be sourced to the country that provides the taxpayer with significant 
governmental benefits related to the derivation of the income.9 The 
connection to governmental benefits should be the guidepost for designing 
source of income rules, because the source rules define the scope of source 
taxation and source taxation is justified by governmental benefits provided to 
a nonresident by the host country.IO Furthermore, even where the source 
rules attempt to implement an economic approach for sourcing income - an 
approach that can be consistent with the benefits principle - the rules in the 
United States and elsewhere often produce distorted binary results: that is, 
generally all of the income from a transaction is either domestic or foreign 
source even though the relevant economic factors suggest that a division of 
the income is warranted. II The results produced by these "single" source 
I · b· 12 ru es at times are ar Itrary. 
The second problem is the variation in the source rules used 
worldwide. 13 This may produce double taxation - two or more countries 
taxing the same income, a result that would impede the free flow of business 
and investment capital. Or alternatively, differences in countries' sourcing 
approaches can lead to non-taxation - no country taxing the particular 
income, which may encourage tax motivated transactions. 
This Article addresses both of these problems by offering an 
approach for sourcing income that has the potential for being adopted by 
countries on a multilateral basis. The Article develops an equity-based 
standard for sourcing that would allow for the derivation of source rules for 
various types of income. The core idea underlying the proposed sourcing 
6. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 454-57,498-502,506-15. 
7. See infra notes 84-106 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 60--61, 68 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 53-59, 94-96 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra Part 1I.C.2. 
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standard is the benefits principle, which calls for the sourcing of income on 
the basis of related government benefits. To an extent, the proposed approach 
is somewhat consistent with source rules currently used in the United States 
and elsewhere. However, unlike the U.S. rules and those of some other 
countries, the proposed approach would not take into account other policy 
concerns, with the exception of administrability. Moreover, the suggested 
approach would divide the income between geographical sources where 
more than one country provides significant governmental benefits that 
contribute to the earning or enjoyment of the income, whereas the current 
rules typically assign income to a single geographical source. By basing the 
source rules on a benefits principle-based standard that allows source to be 
divided when appropriate, this Article seeks to rationalize and harmonize the 
provisions used to source income for purposes of taxing cross-border 
investment and business activities. 
This Article differs from prior work in this area in two important 
respects. First, it offers a multilateral approach for sourcing income, whereas 
earlier studies of significance have taken a national approach, evaluating for 
reform the source rules of the United States. 14 Second, unlike other 
scholarship devoted to the source rules, the Article develops a single 
standard for sourcing income that promotes equity by dividing the income 
tax jurisdiction of countries based on the provision of government benefits 
that relate to the income. Thus, the Article is important in that it develops an 
equity-based standard for sourcing income that may gain international 
acceptance. 15 
Part II of the Article briefly describes source rules used in the United 
States and other countries, reviews the principles underlying the current 
source rules, and describes the significant problems caused by the current 
approach. Part III develops a standard for devising source rules, first by 
identifying the benefits principle and administrability as the appropriate 
principles for developing the standard for sourcing income. This part then 
formulates a standard that would devise source rules by evaluating the source 
of income on the basis of three factors: the destination of the services, 
property, or capital giving rise to income; the location(s) of the activities 
giving rise to income; and the residence of the person receiving income. 
14. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: International 
Aspects of United States Income Taxation: Proposals of the American Law Institute 
on United States Taxation of Foreign Persons and of the Foreign Income of United 
States Persons (1987) (ALI PROJECT I); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, 
supra note 1. 
15. This would be analogous to the international acceptance of the arm's 
length principles to allocate income among commonly controlled entities. See, e.g., 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 9 (2010) [hereinafter 
OECD Model] (calling for the use of arm's length principles to allocate income 
among associated enterprises). 
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Based on this evaluation, the rule for a given type of income may divide the 
source of the income among mUltiple locations. Part N then illustrates the 
use of this standard by suggesting revised source rules for several types of 
income. 16 Part V concludes the Article. 
II. CURRENT SOURCE RULES: DESCRIPTION, 
PRINCIPLES, AND PROBLEMS 
This Part proceeds by briefly describing source rules used in the 
United States and other countries. This is followed by a review of the 
principles underlying the current source rules, and then a description of the 
significant problems caused by the current approach. 
A. Description of Current Source Rules 
The current approach used in the United States and other countries 
for sourcing income is to provide separate source rules for particular types of 
income. Thus, there are different rules for several categories of income, such 
as interest, dividends, service income, rents, royalties, and various types of 
property gains. In addition, while technically not source rules, statutes and 
treaties have provisions that limit or eliminate countries' exercise of source 
taxation. What follows is a brief description of these rules. 
1. Interest and Dividends 
Interest income is typically sourced based on the residence or place 
of incorporation of the borrower. 17 This rule is usually overlaid with 
exceptions for business-related interest, under which interest that is 
associated with a business that is conducted outside the borrower's country 
of residence or incorporation is sourced according to the actual or presumed 
16. This Article will not address the related subject of sourcing deductions, 
that is, linking expense deductions to income from different sources. For purposes of 
both source and residence taxation, it is often necessary to determine the net income 
from different sources. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (a), 904(a). This requires that 
deductions be allocated and apportioned to income from different sources. Under the 
U.S. rules, deductions are generally matched to gross income based on the factual 
relationship between the deductions and income. See Regs. §§ 1.861-8, 8T. There are 
also special allocation and apportionment rules for interest expense and research and 
development costs. See Regs. §§ 1.861-9, 9T, lOT, 17. While determining 
appropriate rules for sourcing deductions is certainly important in crafting 
harmonized source rules, this issue will be left for a future endeavor. 
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(I); OECD Model, supra note IS, at art. 11, 
para. 5; see also Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 510 (stating that interest is 
generally sourced where the payer is resident). 
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location of that business. IS Similar to interest, dividends are generally 
sourced according to the place of incorporation of the corporation paying the 
dividend,19 with exceptions for situations where the corporation derives a 
significant portion of its income outside its country of incorporation. 20 
While the source rule for interest would indicate that the borrower's 
country of residence would generally have taxing rights over the interest 
payments, in most cases source taxation is prevented. Many countries have 
statutes that provide tax exemptions for domestic source interest received by 
foreign persons.21 In addition, income tax treaties between countries usually 
give the country where the interest recipient resides the exclusive right to tax 
interest income.22 For dividends, treaties typically reduce source taxation by 
limiting the source country tax rates on dividends to either fifteen or five 
percent.23 
2. Rents and Royalties 
Rental income from the leasing of tangible property is traditionally 
sourced at the location of the leased property.24 Royalty income from 
licensing intangible property is sourced using a similar, property destination-
type approach, but there are differences among countries in carrying out this 
approach. Under U.S. law, the source of royalty income is determined 
according to the place where the intangible is used.25 The place of use is 
typically the country that is providing the legal protections that relate to the 
18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A), (B); OECD Model, supra note 15, at 
art. 11, para. 5. Under U.S. law prior to 2011, interest paid by a U.S. corporation or 
resident alien was generally treated as foreign source interest in its entirety if the 
payer met the 80 percent foreign business requirements contained in section 861 (c) 
(so called 80120 companies rule). See I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A) (prior to 2011). For 
taxable years beginning after 2010, the 80/20 source rule has been repealed, although 
a similar rule applies to exempt from U.S. source taxation interest (as well as 
dividends) paid by "existing 80/20 companies" (as defined in section 871(1)(1». See 
I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(B), (I), 881(d). 
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861 (a)(2); OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 10. 
20. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B). 
21. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: International 
Aspects of United States Income Taxation II: Proposals of the American Law 
Institute on United States Income Tax Treaties 194 (1992) (ALI PROJECT II); see, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (portfolio interest exemption); I.R.C. §§ 871(i)(2)(A), 
881(d) (bank deposit interest exemption). 
22. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of November 15,2006, 
art. 11, para. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Model]. 
23. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 10, para. 2. 
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(4). 
25. See id 
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intangible.26 In other countries, royalties are often sourced based on the 
residence of the payer or the country from which payment is made?7 Despite 
the source rules for royalties, income tax treaties typically prevent the source 
country from taxing royalty income that is received by residents of the other 
treaty country. 28 
3. Service Income 
A few approaches have emerged for sourcing income from the 
performance of services. Some countries, including the United States, source 
service income according to where the services are performed.29 Other 
countries apply a service destination approach and focus instead on the 
country in which the services are utilized?O Some countries use both 
approaches and determine a domestic source for service income if the 
services are either preformed or utilized in the particular country.3l 
4. Property Gains 
There are several approaches for sourcing gains from the disposition 
of property, with the particular approach based on type of property that is 
involved. For sales of inventory property that is purchased by the taxpayer 
(as opposed to being produced by the taxpayer), the United States generally 
sources the income on the basis of where beneficial ownership and risk of 
loss pass to the buyer - the so-called title passage rule.32 Other countries 
appear to focus on the country where the sales activities giving rise to the 
income takes place.33 For sales of inventory property that is produced by the 
26. See Stephen E. Shay, et aI., Report of the Task Force on International 
Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 773 (2006) [Hereinafter Shay, et aI., Task Force]. 
27. ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21 at 199; See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5 
at 513 (discussing the implicit source rule under the Australian non-resident 
withholding tax, which effectively treats royalties - as well as interest and 
dividends - paid by residents as Australian source income). 
28. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 12, para. 1. 
29. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 86I(a)(3). 
30. ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 57; see ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, 
at 7; Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 506. 
31. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 57. 
32. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(6); Reg. § 1.861-7(c). 
33. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 456 (discussing the source rule for 
export sales of inventory used by Japan for purposes of its foreign tax credit 
limitation, which treats income from such sales as foreign source only if effected 
through a foreign branch or in other circumstances that subject the income to a 
foreign tax). The United States uses this approach in treating income as U.S. source 
where the income is derived by nonresidents from sales of property that are 
attributable to a U.S. fixed place of business. See I.R.c. § 865(e)(2). 
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taxpayer, the United States generally sources 50 percent of the income to the 
country that is the situs of the production activities and 50 percent of the 
income to the country where title to the goods passes to the buyer.34 Other 
countries similarly divide the source of the income between production and 
sales activities, but they may use different methods for determining the 
amount of income that is attributable to the production and sales activities?5 
Although technically not source rules, U.S. statutory and regulatory 
provisions prevent the exercise of source taxation over inventory income 
unless the nonresident is conducting a trade or business in the United 
States.36 Similarly, treaties condition the exercise of source taxation over 
inventory income and other forms of business profits on the existence of a 
permanent establishment in the source country by the nonresident/7 which is 
generally a fixed place of business through which the business is 
conducted.38 
The United States generally sources gain on the sale of other types of 
property based on the residence of the seller.39 Under this rule, gain from the 
sale of a financial asset, such as corporate stock, by a foreign person would 
generally be foreign source.40 Most other countries also generally source 
investment gains based on the residence of the seller.41 However, several 
countries, contrary to the U.S. rule, do impose a source tax on gains realized 
by a nonresident on the sale of stock in a resident corporation.42 Under the 
34. See Reg. § 1.863-3. 
35. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 8. In addition, other countries 
would probably focus on the location of the sales activities as opposed to where title 
passes in sourcing the sales portion of such income. 
36. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b), 881(a), 882(a), 864(b); Reg. § 1.1441-2(b) 
(excluding most gains from the definition of FDAP income, which is the base of the 
U.S. gross basis source tax regime). 
37. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 7. 
38. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 5. 
39. See I.RC. § 865(a). 
40. See I.R.C. §§ 865(a), 865(g). There are other limitations on the source 
taxation of gains from sales of stocks or securities. Under U.S. law, the trading of 
stocks or securities is generally not considered to be a U.S. trade or business for 
purposes of U.S. net basis source taxation, and stock or security gains are generally 
not subject to U.S. gross basis source taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 864(b)(2), 871(a), (b), 
881(a), 882(a); Reg. § 1.1441-2(b). In addition, treaties generally prevent the source 
taxation of stock or security gains. See, e.g., U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 13, 
para. 6. 
41. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 202. 
42. See id.; Joseph L. Andrus, Determining the Source of Income in a 
Changing World, 75 TAXES 839,844 (1997); Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 497-
98, 509; Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Tax Problems of Investment Funds, 
60 TAX LAW. 583,585 (2007) (stating that many countries tax nonresidents on stock 
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U.S. rule, gain on the sale of an intangible would generally be sourced 
according to the residence of seller.43 An exception exists for contingent 
payment sales, in which case the gain is sourced under the royalty rule 
discussed above.44 Gains from sales of real property are sourced in the 
country in which the real property is located.45 In the United States, U.S. 
source treatment also applies to gains from indirect holdings of u.s. realty 
through U.S. corporations whose principal assets are U.s. real estate.46 
B. Principles Underlying the Current Source Rules 
A comprehensive rationale has never been offered for the source 
rules that exist in the United States and other countries.47 Instead, the current 
rules are a product of balancing a complex set of conflicting principles, 
considerations, and claims as they apply to particular income types.48 
1. Connection to Governmental Benefits/Economic Nexus 
An important principle used in formulating source rules is the view 
that income should be sourced to the country that provides governmental 
services and protections that are used in deriving the income.49 In practice, 
this policy is usually carried out by associating income with a geographic 
source based on an economic nexus between the income and a particular 
gains with respect to "local corporations, at least where such corporations are not 
publicly traded and locally listed"). 
43. See I.R.C. § 865(a). 
44. See I.R.C. § 865(d)(I); supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
45. ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37; see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 86 I (a)(5), 
897(c). 
46. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(5), 897(c). 
47. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Andrew Walker, Exceptions in 
Search of a Rule: The Source and Taxability of "None of the Above" Income 4 
(Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, 2009), http://www.law.columbia. 
eduinulVdownload? &exclusive=filemgr.download&file )d= 153762 (stating that 
there is no obvious unifying principle that explains the existing U.S. source rules). 
48. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Walker, supra note, 47 at 5; cf 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
PRESENT-LAW RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, JCX-40-99 (1999) 
(stating that various factors determine the source of income for U.S. purposes, 
including the location or nationality of the payer and recipient, and the location of 
the activities and assets that generate income). 
49. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Lawrence Lokken, What 
is this Thing Called Source? 3-5 (Miami Law Research Paper Series, 2011), 
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1795265 [hereinafter Lokken, Source] (stating that several 
source rules can be explained by a principle that sources income based on the 
location of governmental services and protections utilized in earning income). 
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country. 50 Thus, in determining the source of income from activities, the 
focus is typically on the country in which income-producing activities 
occur.51 Likewise, the source of income derived from property or capital is 
often determined to be the country where the property or capital is used. 52 
Income may well have an economic nexus to two or more countries. 
For example, a bank may perform lending activities in one country in 
connection with a loan made to a borrower who resides in another country; in 
this case, there would be a conflict between the activities and utilization 
bases for sourcing income. 53 Or the conflict could involve the activities basis 
alone, for example, where two selling branches participate in one sales 
transaction. In most cases, the source rules resolve such conflicts by sourcing 
the income to one of the countries involved.54 This is often determined by 
deciding which country has the stronger source claim,55 based either on the 
country with the aspects of the transaction that have the greatest economic 
significance56 or the country that is providing the most important public 
benefits related to the derivation of the income. 57 Sometimes conflicting 
source claims are resolved by determining whether one of the competing 
countries is likely to tax the income, a principle that is discussed below.58 In 
some cases, however, source conflicts are resolved by dividing the income 
between two countries; for example, this approach is used to source 
inventory income where the inventory is produced in one country and sold in 
another. 59 
50. See, e.g., U. S. Treas. Dept, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE 
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 399 (1985) [hereinafter 
TREASURY II] (stating that appropriate source rules "should reflect the location of the 
economic activity generating the income and the source of legal protections 
facilitating the earning of that income"); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; cf 
MICHAEL 1. McINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED 
STATES 3-67 to 3-68 (1996) [hereinafter McIntyre, Tax Rules] ("To the extent 
possible, income should be sourced in a country where it has some economic 
nexus."). As discussed below, economic nexus is an incomplete surrogate for the 
benefits principle. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
51. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note, 14 at 19. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 865(e)(2). 
55. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19. 
56. See id. at 45. 
57. See Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income From International Uses 
and Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REv. 233, 239-40 (1981) 
[hereinafter Lokken, Intellectual Property]. 
58. See infra Part II.B.2. 
59. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
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2. Expectation that Another Country Will Be Taxing the Income 
Another principle that is sometimes used to source income is 
whether it is expected that other countries will be taxing the income.6o The 
United States uses this principle in sourcing several types of income for 
purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation.61 The concern underlying this 
principle is international under taxation. That is, if income is included in 
calculating a residence country's foreign tax credit limitation, but the income 
is not taxed by another country, the taxpayer would be able to cross-credit 
excess foreign tax credits on other foreign income against the pre-credit 
residence country tax on the income, thus resulting in effectively no tax or a 
reduced tax on the income.62 Similarly, if the residence country uses a 
territorial system, exempting income that is not taxed by another country 
would mean that no country is taxing the income. 
To prevent this, a residence country can use the expected-to-tax 
principle to treat income as domestic source, thus removing it from either the 
foreign tax credit limitation or foreign income exemption. When used, this 
principle may serve as a tiebreaker in determining source where the income 
has an economic connection to two or more countries, but only one of the 
countries is expected to tax the income.63 Because of a concern that the 
expected-to-tax principle still allows for substantial cross-crediting 
opportunities, some commentators go further and call for an investigation of 
whether it is feasible to treat income as foreign source for foreign tax credit 
limitation purposes only where a foreign country imposes a significant tax on 
the income.64 In this regard, some countries use a subject-to-tax requirement 
for exempting foreign income under territorial tax systems.65 
60. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 917-18,933 (1987) [hereinafter 
1986 BLUEBOOK]; Andrus, supra note 42, at 843-44. 
61. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 917-18, 932-33 (sales of 
personal property; income from space and certain ocean activities). 
62. See id. at 917-18. 
63. Cf McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-68 to 3-69 ("To the extent 
feasible, income with an economic nexus in more than one country should be 
sourced in a country that is inclined to subject the income to taxation."). 
64. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 151-52; see 
also Robert 1. Peroni, A Hitchhiker's Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit 
Limitation, 56 SMU L. REv. 391,396 (2003). These commentators acknowledge the 
administrative difficulties of such an approach. 
65. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 150; see 
also I.R.C. § 865(e)(1) (personal property gains of U.S. residents otherwise subject 
to residence-based sourcing are treated as foreign source where the sale of the 
personal property is attributable to an office or fixed place of business maintained by 
the U.S. resident in a foreign country, provided that at least a ten percent income tax 
is actually paid to a foreign country with respect to the gain). 
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3. National Interests Unrelated to Traditional Tax Policy Goals 
A country's national interests unrelated to traditional tax policy goals 
may also affect the design of source rules. For example, the United States 
uses the source rules in order to provide export incentives. In 1986 the 
United States generally repealed the title passage rule for sourcing personal 
property gains because it did not want U.S. taxpayers to be able to generate 
foreign source income on sales that were not likely to be subject to a foreign 
tax (an application of the expected-to-tax principle discussed above).66 Such 
low or non-taxed foreign income could be used to absorb excess foreign tax 
credits on high-taxed foreign income.67 However, the United States retained 
the title passage rule for sales of inventory out of a concern that the repeal of 
this rule for inventory sales would create difficulties for U.S. businesses 
competing in international commerce, especially given the substantial U.S. 
trade deficit at that time.68 Thus, the United States' continued use of the title 
passage rule for inventory sales is a form of export incentive. 
In addition, as mentioned above, many countries, including the 
United States, generally provide tax exemptions for domestic source interest 
income received by nonresidents.69 The purpose for the portfolio interest 
exemption is to allow domestic borrowers unrestricted access to the 
Eurobond market, where debt securities are generally free of taxes withheld 
at source and where the issuer would generally be required to pay interest net 
of any source tax.70 To the extent that a source withholding tax is imposed, a 
borrower in the Eurobond market would generally have to gross up the 
interest payment to cover the taX.7l The exemptions for interest promote 
national, non-tax policy objectives by allowing less costly borrowings by 
domestic persons, as well by encouraging non-residents to lend money to 
residents of a particular country. 72 
66. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 918. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
70. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 
1984, at 388-89 (1984). 
71. See id. 
72. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 195 (stating that the U.S. tax 
exemptions for interest reflect a policy judgment that it is critical to stimulate or 
preserve the willingness of non-residents to lend to U.S. borrowers); Yoram Keinan, 
The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing 
Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 1,26 ("The portfolio-interest exception is perhaps the 
purest example of enlightened self-interest and realism in attracting foreign capital." 
(quoting from Dan R. Mastromarco & Lawrence A. Hunter, The Us. Anti-Savings 
Directive, 2002 TNT 247-28)). Similarly, the U.S. rules that generally treat the 
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4. Principles Reflected in Treaties 
As noted above, treaties typically limit a country's exercise of source 
taxation by reducing or eliminating the withholding tax on investment 
income such as interest, dividends, and royalties.73 An important reason for 
the reduction of withholding taxes on investment income is to avoid 
excessive taxation by the source country.74 Gross basis withholding taxes 
that take no account of expenses associated with the income can result in a 
very high rate of tax on the net income from a transaction. The quintessential 
example is interest income derived by a financial institutional upon relending 
funds that are borrowed from others; in this situation, a significant gross 
basis tax may be confiscatory in that it could exceed the amount of net 
income from the transaction.75 
Another, apparent reason for treaty provisions that reduce or 
eliminate source taxation on investment income is the notion that the source 
country's claim to tax such income may be considered to be relatively 
weak.76 The fact that the general elimination of the source tax on interest 
applies not only to financial institutions but also to other interest recipients 
suggests that another principle is at work besides preventing excessive 
source taxation.77 Likewise, the treaty rate on dividends, typically fifteen 
percent, seems lower than necessary to address concerns of a high rate of 
source tax on net income, given the degree of associated expenses usually 
incurred in connection with portfolio investments.78 
trading of stocks or securities as not constituting a U.S. trade or business were 
enacted to encourage foreign persons to invest in U.S. capital markets. See id. at 54. 
73. See supra notes 22-23, 28 and accompanying text. 
74. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 9. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 194 (referring to this as a possible basis for the general treaty 
elimination of source taxation of interest income); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, 
Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REv. 537, 569 (2003) (stating that 
the source country's claim to tax portfolio income is more attenuated than its claim 
to tax business income and that the claims of the residence country seem to deserve 
priority in the inter-nation allocation of tax jurisdiction over portfolio income; 
pointing out that primary allocation of taxing rights over portfolio income reflects 
this priority). 
77. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 193-94. 
78. Cf OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 10 
cmt. (2008) [hereinafter OEeD Model 2008] (stating that the 15 percent treaty rate 
on dividends appears to be a reasonable maximum rate given that the source country 
can already tax the corporation's profits); but see ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 
184 (stating that the object of treaty provisions that limit the source country rate on 
dividends seems to be keep the rate low enough so that in many cases the source tax 
will not exceed the net basis tax that would be imposed in the residence country). 
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5. Administrability 
Administrability is an important consideration in devising source 
rules.79 Although more than one country may be connected to the derivation 
of income, the current source rules usually determine a single source 
apparently because of a concern that a multi-source approach would be 
overly complex.80 Source rules also attempt to avoid detailed factual 
inquiries. In this regard, both the title passage rule8l and the 50-50 source 
rules used by the United States in a few contexts82 allow for bright line 
determinations of source. Simplicity is especially desirable for the source 
rules that are used to determine withholding obligations,83 such as those for 
interest, dividends, and royalties. 
C. Problems with the Current Source Rules 
The current approach for sourcing income suffers from two 
fundamental and related problems. First, the source rules lack coherence in 
that they fail to advance a consistent normative tax policy. In particular, the 
rules fail to reflect the consistent application of the key principle appropriate 
for allocating nations' primary taxing rights - namely, the benefits 
principle. And second, because of a lack of coherence, there may be 
considerable variation in the source rules used worldwide, thus increasing the 
likelihood of double taxation and non-taxation. 
1. Lack of Coherence 
The current sources rules employed in the United States and 
elsewhere fail to advance a consistent normative tax policy.84 This leads to 
79. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra 
note 50, at 3-66. 
80. See ALLISON CHRISTIANS, SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & PHILIP F. 
POSTLEWAITE, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 20--21 (2008). 
81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
82. See I.R.C. §§ 863(c), 863(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3. 
83. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3--66. 
84. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 83-84 
("Because no clear economic or equitable principles guide the formulation of rules to 
divide income and expense by geographic origin, the construction of these rules has 
been a significantly arbitrary exercise.") & n.3 ("[T]he claimed rationale for most 
source rules has a substantial element of arbitrariness."); Ruth Mason, Tax 
Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540, 1591 (2009) 
(stating that the source rules have long be criticized for their arbitrariness); Michael 
J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solutionfor the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses, 
62 BULL. INT'L T AX'N 486, 489 (2008) [hereinafter Graetz, Multilateral Solution] 
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different sourcing approaches for economically similar types of income.85 
For example, dividends are generally sourced based on the country of 
incorporation of the corporation paying the dividend.86 In contrast, as a result 
of the expected-to-tax principle,8? stock gains are generally sourced under the 
U.S. rules according to the residence of the seller.88 Yet, in substance the two 
items are quite similar given that stock gains represent a market 
capitalization of future earnings.89 The different source consequences on the 
sale versus license of a patent are also a result of basing source rules on 
different principles.9o Similarly, the source tax exemption that generally 
applies to interest, which is to allow domestic borrowers unrestricted access 
(stating that it is well known that "the 'source' of income is not well grounded 
economically, nor is it conceptually straightforward," that in many instances 
"archaic rules and distinctions prevail," and that it may be that the "current sourcing 
rules seem arbitrary and archaic"); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless 
Income 56 (USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-7, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791783 [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons) ("[T)he global tax 
norms that define the geographic source of income or expense are largely artificial 
constructs, difficult to administer and often devoid of any conceptual foundation."); 
Han Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for 
International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1,76 (2010) (arguing that "the 
notorious complexity of source rules is due primarily to a lack of normative 
comprehension as to what they are expected to achieve"); cf Arthur J. Cockfield, 
The Rise of the OECD as Informal "World Tax Organization" Through National 
Responses to E-Commerce Challenges, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 136, 175 (2006) 
(referring to observations that international tax policy suffers from a degree of 
arbitrariness because of a lack of agreement on guiding principles). 
85. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at n.3 
(providing an example of the often capricious nature of the source rules that involves 
the title passage rule for sales of inventory); cf Willard B. Taylor & Diana L. 
Wollman, Why Can't We All Just Get Along: Finding Consistent Solutions to the 
Treatment of Derivatives and Other Problems, 53 TAX LAW. 95, 95, 113-18 (1999) 
(pointing out the differences in the source rules applying to several types of 
derivative financial instruments and the lack of a seeming purpose for such; 
suggesting that there could be a single rule for sourcing derivative gains and losses). 
86. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. It should be noted that 
the expected-to-tax principle is problematic in some cases, in that a determination 
that other countries are not imposing a source tax on a particular type of income may 
not always be correct. See Andrus, supra note 42 (pointing out that the United 
States' application of residence based sourcing of gains from the disposition of 
foreign corporate stock pursuant to the expected-to-tax principle can result in double 
taxation because a significant number of countries do tax nonresidents on such 
gains). 
89. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122. 
90. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
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to the Eurobond market,91 is inconsistent with the general source taxation of 
other types of investment income, such as dividends, rents, and royalties. 92 
More fundamentally, the rules fail to reflect the consistent 
application of the key principle appropriate for allocating nations' primary 
taxing rights - namely, the benefits principle. As developed more fully in 
the next part,93 the connection to governmental benefits should be the 
guidepost for designing source of income rules, because the source rules 
define the scope of source taxation and source taxation is justified by 
governmental benefits provided to a nonresident by the host country. In this 
regard, equity supports host country taxation of nonresidents who benefit 
from host country governmental services so that the costs of these services 
are not borne solely by residents of that country. 
While the economic nexus principle can function to a degree as a 
surrogate for focusing on governmental benefits,94 the general binary nature 
of the source rules results in a failure to appropriately allocate primary tax 
jurisdiction in accordance with the provision of government benefits. As 
discussed above, the current source rules often assign all of the income to a 
single geographic source even though relevant economic activities occur in 
more than one country.95 Although administrative considerations counsel 
against a sourcing approach that would take into account all countries that 
might have some connection to the income,96 one certainly should question 
the soundness of the current approach that usually ignores all but one of the 
connected countries. Moreover, the decision to choose a particular country as 
the most important either in terms of economic contribution or provision of 
public benefits often is arbitrary.97 For example, where an intangible is 
produced in one country and licensed for use in another country, is it so clear 
that the latter country is the most important in the derivation of the income?98 
91. See supra notes 21, 70-72 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 19-20, 24-27 and accompanying text. 
93. See infra Part 1I1.B.1. 
94. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
97. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591 n.195 (noting different possible 
bases for sourcing sales income (where title passes, place of sale, or place of 
consumption) and interest income (including the residence of the borrower, where 
the principal is either made available or used, or where interest payments are made»; 
cf Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REv. 261, 317 (200 I) [hereinafter 
Graetz, Inadequate Principles] (stating that the source rules "should be overhauled 
to be better linked to the location of real economic activity, the location of 
customers, workers, or assets"). 
98. Under section 861(a)(4), the royalty income will be sourced where the 
intangible is being used. 
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And when compared to a similar situation involving services performed in 
one country that are utilized in another country, the U.S. source rules appear 
inconsistent, given that the source of the service income typically will be in 
the country in which the services are performed.99 (As mentioned above, 
some countries use a service destination approach for sourcing service 
income. \0<) 
The arbitrary and inconsistent results of single source rules are 
exacerbated by the need to characterize transactions. \01 Characterization is 
particularly necessary and often problematic in the case of transactions 
involving intangibles and electronic commerce, where the income from a 
given transaction may take the form of royalties, compensation, or property 
gains based on the specific facts and circumstances. \02 And because the 
single source rules produce very different results depending on the ~e of 
income involved,103 a great deal turns on how income is characterized. I For 
example, where a U.S. resident develops an invention in the United States, 
obtains a foreign patent on the invention, and then sells the foreign patent for 
a lump sum amount, all of the gain will be U.S. source;105 however, if instead 
of selling the patent the taxpayer licenses the patent in exchange for a lump 
sum royalty for a period that is slightly less than the patent's remaining life, 
all of the income would be foreign source.106 Despite the similarity in the 
substance of these two alternatives, the source results are quite different. 
2. Variation in Source Rules Used Worldwide 
Because of a lack of coherence, there may be considerable variation 
in the source rules used worldwide. l07 This raises the concern of double 
99. LR.C. § 861(a)(3). 
100. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
101. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591 (referring to disputes about how to 
classify income). 
102. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 43; Andrus, supra note 42, at 
855-56; David G. Noren, Commentary, The U.S. National Interest in International 
Tax Policy, 54 TAX L. REv. 337, 345 (2001) (pointing out that many electronic 
commerce activities can plausibly be analogized to any of these categories). 
103. See supra Part ILA. 
104. See Noren, supra note 102, at 345. 
105. 1.R.c. §§ 865(a), 865(g)(l). This assumes that the sale was not 
attributable to a foreign office maintained by the U.S. resident and subject to foreign 
tax of at least ten percent. See LR.C. § 865(e){l). 
106.I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4). 
107. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that "the rules 
defining the source of income may vary considerably from country to country"); 
Ault &. Arnold, supra note 5, at 498-502, 506-09 (discussing differences in 
countries' approaches for attributing income to domestic branches, determining the 
source of employment income, and exercising source taxation over gains derived by 
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taxation - that two or more countries are taxing the same income, a result 
that would impede the free flow of business and investment capital. 108 Or 
alternatively, differences in countries' sourcing approaches can lead to non-
taxation - that no country is taxing the particular income, which may 
encourage inefficient, tax-motivated transactions. 109 
Where more than one country has a connection to an income item 
(which is often the case), the single source approach requires that the income 
be sourced to only one of the countries. In this regard, nations may come to a 
different conclusion as to the appropriate country, thus creating differences 
in source rules. I 10 For example, some countries source service income based 
on where the services are performed, while others focus on where the 
services are utilized I II or a mixture of the place of performance, the place of 
contract, and place of payment. 112 Likewise, countries choose the single 
source differently with respect to royalty income, with some countries using 
the location of the payer or place of payment, while other countries focus on 
where the intangible is being used. I I In addition, countries use substantially 
nonresidents from disposing of substantial shareholdings in domestic corporations); 
Technical Advisory Group on Monitoring the Application of Existing Treaty Norms 
for Taxing Business Profits, DECD, Are the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing 
Business Profits Appropriate for E-Commerce? Final Report 26, 
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/58/53/35869032.pdf [hereinafter DECD, E-
Commerce] (pointing out that even developed countries have different approaches 
for determining source taxation of business profits); Dleksandr Pastukhov, Going 
Where No Taxman Has Gone Before: Preliminary Conclusions and 
Recommendations Drawnfrom a Decade of Debate on the International Taxation of 
E-Commerce, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1,6-7 (2009) (pointing out that 
the lack of uniformity among nations in taxing electronic commerce leads to taxing 
authorities being perplexed over the country that should have taxing rights). 
108. See Mcintyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 1-3 to 1-4; Graetz, 
Multilateral Solution, supra note 84, at 489. 
109. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 1-4; Graetz, Multilateral 
Solution, supra note 84, at 489. 
110. See Michael J. McIntyre, The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-
States, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES, ch. 8 (Brian 
J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Eric M. Zolt, eds.) 263 (2003) ("Because the source 
of income is not obvious in many cases, the source rules adopted by various 
countries sometimes conflict."). 
Ill. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
112. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 506-07 (discussing the Australian 
approach for sourcing employment income for purposes of exercising source 
taxation over nonresidents). 
113. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. While countries 
generally source interest income based on the residence of the borrower (see supra 
notes 17-18 and accompanying text), for purposes of its foreign tax credit limitation, 
Australia sources interest that is not subject to a foreign tax based on the where the 
584 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 11:7 
different approaches in attributing income to domestic branches of 
nonresidents for purposes of exercising source taxation. 114 In this regard, 
some countries focus on the economic connection between income items and 
the branch, while other countries use "force of attraction" approaches that 
attribute domestic source income to the branch regardless of an actual 
economic connection, with source determined based on an independent set of 
source rules. l1s The details of the approaches for sourcing branch income 
tend to be relatively undeveloped - for example, the source rules are 
sometimes from judge-made law that operate on a facts-and-circumstances 
or similar basis. 116 
Moreover, even if countries decided their single source rules in the 
same way, there could still be differences in source results where countries 
characterized income items differently.ll7 Assume that another country has 
the same source rules as the United States with respect to service income and 
royalties, but uses different rules for characterizing transactions as either the 
performance of services or the licensing of an intangible. Under these 
circumstances, the United States and the other country would source a given 
cross-border transaction differently if the United States characterized the 
transaction as the performance of services while the other country viewed it 
as the licensing of an intangible. 
Not surprisingly, the use of different principles for devising source 
rules can lead to different source rules. For example, based on the expected-
to-tax principle,118 the United States generally sources stock gains based on 
the residence of the seller. 119 However, several countries impose a source tax 
on gains realized by a nonresident on the sale of stock in a resident 
corporation,120 presumably on the basis of the economic nexus principle. 121 
funds are made available, which may be the place where the funds are advanced or 
where the contract was executed. See Ault and Arnold, supra note 5, at 457. 
114. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 498. 
115. See id. at 499. 
116. See id. at 500 (discussing the Australian facts-and-circumstances 
approach for business income, which appears to source sales income where the 
contract is made; discussing the Canadian approach under which income is treated as 
domestic source if it may be allocated in a reasonable manner to a nonresident's 
Canadian branch). 
117. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37, n.46 (noting the problem of 
conflicting characterizations of transactions by countries); ALI PROJECT II, supra 
note 21, at 235 (discussing the potential for double taxation or under taxation where 
countries characterize transactions differently); Andrus, supra note 42, at 856 
(same). 
118. See supra notes 60--63 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
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This difference in treatment can lead to double taxation where a U.S. resident 
sells stock in a foreign coworation that results in a source tax in the 
corporation's home country.12 
In situations where countries use different domestic source rules, 
bilateral income tax treaties may resolve conflicts in source rules. U.S. 
treaties typically provide that for the purposes of the U.S. foreign tax credit 
limitation, income that may be taxed by the other country under the treaty 
will be sourced in that country.123 Sometimes treaties even provide explicit 
source rules in separate articles. 124 Thus, for example, treaties may prevent 
double taxation in the situation where a U.S. resident is subject to a source 
tax on the sale of foreign corporate stock. 125 However, existing treaties fail to 
comprehensively deal with potential conflicts in domestic source rules. In 
this regard, treaties often lack specific details with regard to attributing 
business profits to pennanent establishments,126 and countries may interpret 
such provisions differently.127 Moreover, in limiting source taxation and 
guaranteeing that countries use foreign tax credit or exemption systems, 
treaties aim to avoid double taxation, and thus do not prevent the non-
taxation of cross-border income that results when countries' varying source 
rules create under lapping tax jurisdiction. 128 Furthennore, a bilateral treaty-
based solution to the problem of double taxation or non-taxation stemming 
from source rule conflicts is an incomplete solution, because treaties between 
countries may not always exist. 129 
122. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 844. 
123. See U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 23, para. 3; ALI PROJECT II, 
supra note 21 at 233-34. 
124. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 234. 
125. See, e.g., Convention Between the U.S. and Spain for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, Feb. 22, 1990, art. 13, para. 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/spain.pdf; 
Andrus, supra note 42, at 844. 
126. See U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 7. 
127. See Jessica L. Katz, Charles T. Plambeck & Diane M. Ring, Taxation 
of Foreign Persons' u.s. Income, 908-2nd T.M. (BNA), at V.C.3.b(2) (stating that 
most U.S. treaty partners, along with the GECD, take the position that Article 7(2) of 
the GECD model treaty requires the recognition of interbranch interest expense of a 
bank, whereas the United States traditionally disagreed with this interpretation of the 
GECD treaty). 
128. Cj Peroni, supra note 64, at 396 (pointing out that the current U.S. 
source rules often allow income that is not subject to foreign taxation (for example, 
by reason of a U.S. income tax treaty) to be treated as foreign source income and 
thus inflate a taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation). 
129. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 844. 
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III. EQUITy-BASED STANDARD FOR DEVISING SOURCE RULES 
A. Overview, Basic Assumptions, and Preliminary Matters 
To address the problems identified above, this part develops a 
benefits principles-based standard for devising source rules that has the 
potential to be adopted on a multilateral basis. 130 An internationally 
harmonized approach to sourcing income that is based on the connection to 
governmental benefits should result in a fair allocation of taxing jurisdiction 
among nations; this could replace the current patchwork of rules, which often 
produce incoherent and arbitrary results.13I And a principled standard that is 
considered fair by a critical mass of countries could lead to internationally 
harmonized source rules.132 In this regard, an important goal is that the 
allocation of tax jurisdiction via source rules or their equivalent be mutually 
agreeable,133 so that source taxation does not result in either double taxation 
or non-taxation. 134 
This Part proceeds in two steps: first by establishing the case for 
using the benefits principle along with administrability as the appropriate 
principles for designing source rules, and second by formulating a standard 
for devising source rules that is based on the appropriate principles. Before 
doing so, a few assumptions and preliminary matters are in order. 
First, it is assumed that countries will continue to exercise source 
taxation, as opposed to abandoning such in favor of exclusive residence 
130. Cf id. at 856 (concluding that "to address the tax issues created by the 
changing economy, international consensus must be developed with regard to 
characterizations issues as well as source rules"). 
131. Cf McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66 (pointing out 
that each country should receive a reasonable share of the global tax base pursuant to 
a fair negotiating process). 
132. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in 
International Taxation, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1335, 1345 (2001) (calling for the 
adoption of a formula via mutual international agreement that "generally is 
acceptable for reasons of fairness" in order to achieve international cooperation in 
the sharing of the tax base); cf Benshalom, supra note 84, at 79 (stating that 
effective tax cooperation among nations can be facilitated where "it involves an 
organizing principle that all parties consider fair"); Rifat Azam, E-Commerce 
Taxation and Cyberspace Law: The Integrative Adaptation Model, 12 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 5 (viewing an approach for taxing electronic commerce that divides the tax 
pie fairly as having the potential to gain international acceptance). 
133. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66 (stating that a 
goal of model source rules should be the allocation of taxing jurisdiction in some 
mutually agreeable manner); cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 856 (calling for 
international consensus on source rules to address sourcing issues created by 
electronic commerce and other aspects ofthe changing economy). 
134. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66. 
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taxation. Second, it is assumed that countries will continue to adhere to the 
"single tax principle" - subjecting cross-border income to one tax - and 
thus attempt to avoid double taxation and non-taxation by employing either 
foreign tax credit or territorial systems. 135 Third, it is assumed that in 
allocating taxing rights over cross-border business and investment income, 
countries will continue to use the separate transactions method (source and 
transfer pricing rules), rather than applying formulary apportionment 
h d ' . 136 met 0 s to a taxpayer s aggregate net Income. 
135. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic 
Commerce, 52 TAX L. REv. 507, 517 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Electronic 
Commerce]. The single tax principle has been justified "on both theoretical and 
practical grounds." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the 
International Tax Regime, 61 BULL. INT'L TAX'N 130, 134 (2007). With regard to 
theory, a heavier tax on cross-border income as compared to domestic income would 
create an inefficient incentive to invest domestically; a lighter tax on cross-border 
income would create an inefficient incentive to invest abroad. Id In addition, the 
non-taxation of cross-border income when compared to the taxation of domestic 
labor income can violate both horizontal and vertical equity. See id From a practical 
perspective, double taxation of cross-border income would tend to stifle 
international investment, while non-taxation of such income can lead to the 
avoidance of domestic taxation by investing internationally, thereby eroding the 
national tax base. Id 
136. Recently, several notable commentators on international taxation have 
proposed using formulary apportionment to allocate tax jurisdiction over the income 
of related multi-national corporations. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. 
Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A 
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 497, 498 (2009). 
While it is conceivable, it is not likely that formulary apportionment will replace the 
current system in the foreseeable future. See James J. Tobin, Barbara M. Angus, & 
David J. Canale, Preserving and Protecting the Arm's-Length Standard, INT'L TAX 
MON., July 19,2010 (asserting that the arm's-length standard should continue to be 
at the center ofthe international tax system); see also Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 
84, at 66 (pointing out that without some form of multilateral cooperation, formulary 
apportionment poses a substantial risk of over or under taxation; concluding that "[i]t 
is difficult to imagine how a multilateral global formulary apportionment system can 
come to pass); Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It 
Better Than The Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT'L TAX 
1. 1145, 1182-83 (2010) (concluding that formula apportionment and separate 
accounts distort behavior along different margins and that simulations indicate that 
the former has no clear advantages over the latter); Susan C. Morse, Revisiting 
Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REv. 593 (20 10) (questioning the 
benefits of the unilateral U.S. adoption of a destination sales-based formulary 
apportionment method for dividing global jurisdiction to tax corporate income). 
Consequently, this Article assumes the continued use of source and transfer pricing 
rules to allocate taxing rights over income among nations. 
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The harmonized source rules developed under the sourcing standard 
should be the same for countries' taxation of both in-bound transactions by 
nonresidents and out-bound transactions by residents. 137 Where countries use 
uniform source rules, but the rules for in-bound and out-bound transactions 
differ, either double taxation or non-taxation will result. 138 For example, 
assume that all countries adopted a rule that sourced service income based on 
the location of the recipient of the services for in-bound transactions and on 
the place of performing services for out-bound transactions. A Country A 
resident performs services in Country A for a company that is located in 
Country B. Under the in-bound source rule, the Country A resident would 
have Country B source income that is subject to tax in County B because the 
recipient of the services was located there. However, under the out-bound 
source rule, Country A would treat the income as domestic source for 
purposes of calculating its resident's allowable foreign tax credit (assuming 
it uses a foreign tax credit system that includes a limitation based on the 
amount of foreign source income), because the services were performed in 
Country A. Consequently, the Country A resident may be prohibited from 
receiving a foreign tax credit against her Country A tax liability for the 
Country B tax, thus potentially resulting in double taxation. If the source 
rules were reversed, it could be that neither country would be taxing the 
income. 
Finally, the standard should be used to devise source rules that form 
the basis for countries' exercise of taxing jurisdiction. 139 Thus, income that is 
137. See ALI PROJECT I supra note 14, at 348-49 (stating that 
"presumptively at least, the 'inbound' and 'outbound' source rules should be the 
same"); PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORA TE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXA nON AND 
ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES, 445-446 (1996) (stating that 
the only reference point in evaluating whether countries appropriately tax 
international income "is the symmetry of their own tax system"). Some 
commentators disagree with this, but they are approaching the issue of sourcing from 
the perspective of enhancing the welfare of U.S. individuals. See Shay, Fleming & 
Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 150-51. As mentioned above, the objective of 
this Article is to develop a sourcing standard that can be adopted multilaterally, 
which thus should refrain from taking into account particular countries' national 
interests. See infra note 223-225 and accompanying text. 
138. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 843 (source rules that do not treat U.S. 
and foreign taxpayers the same will inevitably lead to double taxation or non-
taxation). 
139. Nevertheless, as under current law, certain countries, generally 
referred to as tax havens, may impose little or no tax on income over which they 
have jurisdiction to tax. Consequently, it is assumed that countries may continue to 
employ mechanisms designed to prevent their residents from avoiding current taxes 
on certain income that is allocated to tax haven corporations, such as the anti-
deferral regimes used in the United States - (subpart F rules (I.R.C. §§ 951-965)) 
and the PFIC rules (I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298)). In addition, with the proposed sourcing 
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treated as domestic source with respect to a particular country would be 
subject to tax in the hands of a nonresident of that country;140 unlike current 
U.S. law, 141 operative tax provisions will not prevent the taxation of income 
that is treated as domestic source. Likewise, income that is treated as foreign 
source would be nontaxable to a nonresident. 142 Similarly, it is contemplated 
that since there will be multilateral agreement on source via harmonized 
domestic rules, treaties would not generally alter the taxing rights of 
countries, although treaties may still affect to some degree the tax rates that 
apply to particular types of income. 143 
B. Appropriate Principles for Sourcing Income 
1. The Benefits Principle 
As discussed earlier,l44 the source rules are used to determine the 
contours of countries' exercise of source taxation, that is, the taxation by a 
host country over nonresidents. Source rules also affect the scope of 
countries' exercise of residence taxation - the taxation by a country of its 
residents. 145 This effect, however, is derivative of source taxation. Countries 
that mitigate double taxation through foreign tax credit systems cede primary 
tax jurisdiction with respect to their residents over income that is viewed as 
properly subject to source taxation by host countries. Countries that use 
territorial systems that exempt foreign source income cede all tax jurisdiction 
over such income. Because the source rules define the scope of source 
approach, countries also may want to exercise residual tax jurisdiction over the 
foreign source portion of income derived by nonresidents from domestic activities. 
See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
140. Cf ALI PROJECT Part I, supra note 14, at 115 (recommending that U.S. 
source income generally be subject to either U.S. net basis or gross basis taxation, 
although providing exceptions for certain items, including portfolio interest). 
141. See, e.g., LR.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (portfolio interest exemption). 
142. Under current U.S. law, it is possible for a foreign person to be taxable 
on foreign source income. See LR.C. §§ 864(c)(4), 882(a). 
143. This may be warranted in order to ameliorate the excessive burdens of 
gross basis taxes where a taxpayer is likely to incur significant expenses in earning 
income - for example, interest income earned by a nonresident bank. See supra 
notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Of course, this could also be done through 
harmonized domestic legislation, but there may be reasons why countries may find 
the treaty process more appropriate for such provisions. See ALI PROJECT II, supra 
note 21, at 12-13 (stating that a source country may not want to forgo taxing income 
that is received by a resident of a tax haven country). With regard to the permanent 
establishment requirement for subjecting business income to source taxation, it may 
be advisable to retain the requirement, albeit in modified form. See infra note 342. 
144. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
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taxation, the principles that form the basis for source taxation should be used 
in formulating source rules. 
It is widely accepted that source taxation is grounded on the benefits 
principle: a host country should have the right to tax a nonresident on income 
that benefits from host country government services, with the tax serving as a 
charge, of sorts, for these benefits. l46 A nonresident with investments or 
business activities in the host country benefits from numerous government 
activities, including those that give rise to infrastructure (physical, economic, 
146. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Lokken, Intellectual 
Property, supra note 57 at 239; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, 
at 90; Peggy B. Musgrave, INTERJURISDICTIONAL EQUITY IN COMPANY TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN TAXING CAPITAL 
INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 46, 52-53 (Sjibren Cnossen ed., 2000), reprinted 
in Michael J. Graetz, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 6 
(2003); Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 521; Graetz & 
Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569; Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical Presence in 
the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REv. 993, 1040 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kirsch, Services]; Mason, supra note 84, at 1553-54; Carlo Garbarino, A 
Study of the International Tax Policy Process: Defining the Rules for Sourcing 
Income from Isolated Sales of Goods, 29 HARv. INT'L LJ. 393,394 (1988); William 
B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing, and 
Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 349, 369-70 (2007); 
Benshalom, supra note 84, at 75; Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less 
Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime, 
84 TUL. L. REv. 125, 161 & n.163 (2009) (referring to the benefits principle, used to 
assign tax jurisdiction, as being in some respects ''the cornerstone of the modern 
income tax regime"); Kim Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an 
Important but Underappreciated International Tax Policy Objective, in TAX 
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 471, 492 (John G. Head & Richard Krever, eds., 
2009); Lokken, Source, supra note 49 at 3; Jeffrey M. Colon, Financial Products 
and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the Crossroads, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 781; Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: 
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1289, 1293-
94 (2011) (viewing source taxation as justified by the benefits principle on a 
theoretical level); cf OECD, E-Commerce supra note 107, at 12, (referring to the 
benefits principle as a justification for source taxation; stating that source taxation 
may also serve to prevent nonresidents from capturing all of the economic rent 
derived from exploiting the host country's resources); Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and 
Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. REv. 867, 904-05 (2006) 
(stating that source taxation is typically grounded either upon the benefits principle 
or a theory of economic rents). For a recent discussion of the benefits principle for 
taxation in general, see James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New 
Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 V AND. L. REv. 1129, 1135-38 (2008). 
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and legal), public safety, national security, and a skilled workforce. 147 
Consequently, a key principle in detennining whether an item of income 
should be sourced to a particular country is whether that country provides the 
taxpayer with governmental benefits that relate to the income. 148 
Closely aligned with the benefits principle basis for sourcing is the 
view that income should be sourced according to the location of the 
economic activities that give rise to the income.149 The economic nexus basis 
for sourcing is best understood as a surrogate for the benefits principle -
that is, the location of economic activities is where the taxpayer receives 
government benefits that justify a source tax. 150 Indeed, authorities referring 
to the economic nexus basis for sourcing income usually also refer to the 
place of legal protections as a basis for sourcing,ISI thus suggesting that it is 
the connection to government benefits that underlies the focus on economic 
activities. Importantly, economic nexus is an incomplete surrogate for the 
benefits principle in that by focusing on the location of economic activities 
conducted by taxpayer, it ignores government benefits provided by the 
taxpayer's country of residence that relate to the earning and enjoyment of 
income by the taxpayer. 152 
147. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90; 
Mason, supra note 84, at 1553-54. For a more detailed discussion of these public 
benefits, see infra Part III.C.I. 
148. See Col6n, supra note 146, at 781 ("A designation of an item of 
income as U.S. (or foreign) source indicates that the United States (or a foreign 
country) is the country that has provided the primary benefits resulting in the earning 
of such income and therefore has primary tax jurisdiction."); Lokken, Source, supra 
note 49 at 3-4 (proposing a conceptual framework for source determinations that 
"apportions a taxpayer's ability to pay among jurisdictions in a way that reflects the 
governmental services and protections available to the taxpayer in profit-seeking 
activities"); cf DECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 14 n.20 (noting that the 
benefits principle, which provides a justification for source taxation, "can also be put 
forward as a principle for determining the source of the business profits"). 
149. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
150. See Dean, supra note 146, at 162 & n.l64 (indicating that the benefits 
principle underlies the recognized right of a country to tax income derived from 
economic activity occurring within its borders). 
151. See TREASURY II, supra note 50, at 399. 
152. Cf Dean, supra note 146, at 161 n.162 (stating that the benefits 
principle also describes the relationship between a country and its residents and 
citing PEGGIE BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 (1963) for the proposition that a country has the right to tax 
the income and wealth of its residents based on the protection and servl\;es provided 
by the country). These residence country benefits are more fully described below. 
See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Professor 
Lokken, in proposing a conceptual framework for source determinations that relies 
on the benefits principle, would not take into account consumer benefits received by 
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Source taxation may also be justified by the right of a host country to 
exact a charge for economic rents, or super-normal returns, realized by 
nonresidents through the use of a country's resources.153 This basis for 
source taxation, however, should properly be viewed as merely a supplement 
to the benefits principle basis, as it would only permit a host country to tax 
super-normal returns. In both theory and practice, it is widely acknowledged 
that source taxation extends to all income that bears a sufficient economic 
connection to the host country, not just super-normal returns. 154 
At its core, the benefits principle underlying source taxation is an 
equitable principle. Nonresidents who earn income that profits from a 
country's government activities should be subject to source taxation on such 
income; otherwise, the burden for these government activities that benefit 
individuals that do not directly relate to the production of income. See Lokken, 
Source, supra note 49 at 3. 
153. See OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 12; Robert A. Green, The 
Future of Sourced-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 
CORNELL L. REv. 18,30 (1993); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-
Based Direct Taxationfor Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAXJ. 
145, 148 (1992); Kane, supra note 140, at 904-05. 
154. See Green, supra note 153, at 30 (stating that this argument does not 
justify source-based corporate income taxes); but see McLure, supra note 153, at 
149 (considering the adoption of consumption-based direct taxation as the 
international norm, the effect of which would be source taxation of only economic 
rents for the most part). The power of governments to impose source taxes, or force 
majeure, is another explanation given for source taxation. See Green, supra note, 153 
at 31-32. Even if force majeure were an explanation, it would apparently not provide 
a principle for designing source rules suitable for worldwide adoption. One 
commentator has offered a pragmatic justification for source taxation - that the 
source country is generally in the best position to enforce a tax on cross-border 
income. See id. Arguably, this possible justification for source taxation could 
provide a basis for designing sources rules, under which income could be sourced to 
the country that is able to monitor transnational income by requiring local firms and 
financial intermediaries to report and withhold on payments they make to 
nonresidents. However, basing source taxation and implementing source rules on a 
country's enforcement capabilities appears to go too far, in that tax collection can be 
protected even without source taxation of cross-border income by requiring the 
country in the better position to monitor cross-border income to report such income 
to the recipient's country of residence or to withhold tax subject to refunds upon 
demonstration that a residence country tax has been paid. Cf GARY CLYDE 
HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 
68-71 (1992) (recommending similar measures for a system that imposes residence-
only taxation of portfolio income). Consequently, countries' enforcement 
capabilities should not provide the primary basis for designing multilateral source 
rules, although enforcement concerns should be a factor is formulating particular 
source rules. See infra Part III.C.3.b for a discussion of this latter point. 
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nonresidents would be borne by residents of that country alone. ISS Thus, an 
equitable sharing of the cost of government activities between nonresidents 
and residents is at the root of source taxation. 
The equity basis underlying source taxation can be described as a 
form of inter-individual equity, because it requires the fair treatment of 
taxpayers - residents and nonresidents - who receive governmental 
benefits from a particular country.IS6 It can also be described as inter-nation 
equity, a term that usually refers to the equitable sharing among nations of 
the taxation of cross-border business and investment income. 157 In any event, 
the normative basis for inter-nation equity, if any, would appear to rest on 
the theoretical foundation for inter-individual equity, since it is individuals 
that ultimately pay taxes. IS8 
155. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 96-97 
("Domestic fairness requires that the costs of the U.S. government be borne both by 
(I) residents on the basis of ability to pay, and (2) nonresidents on the basis of an 
appropriate charge for the privilege of exploiting the U.S. market. To the extent that 
abandonment of source taxation relieves nonresidents of their charge, the tax burden 
belonging to nonresidents inevitably will shift to U.S. residents. A failure of 
nonresidents to contribute to the costs of government, would therefore, diminish, not 
enhance, domestic tax fairness."); See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the 
Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 145, 153 (1998) 
(referring to the conclusion of other commentators that under the benefit theory for 
source taxation "individuals who benefit equally from government, including 
nonresidents, should contribute to the host country's cost of government"). 
156. See Kaufman, supra note 155 at 153 (stating that most scholarship on 
residence and source taxation internationalizes inter-individual equity). 
157. See id at 153-54 (citing to writings by Peggy Musgrave and Richard 
Musgrave describing inter-nation equity in various ways: "an 'equitable 
international distribution of the tax base, '" '''an equitable division of the tax revenue 
between countries,'" "an equitable 'allocation of national gain and loss,'" '''[t]he 
problem of tax shares in international business, '" and "an equitable division of the 
'tax pie ... among the treasuries of the various countries"'). 
158. In examining whether tax competition among nations should be 
reconsidered in order to promote inter-nation equity, Professor Ring evaluated the 
normative basis for inter-nation equity in terms of inter-individual equity ("because 
it is the individuals for whom we are ultimately concerned") and concluded that "to 
fit inter-nation equity into the current framework of inter-individual equity 
(premised on a legitimate nation-state and community) we can only endorse the 
'inter-nation version' of inter-individual equity ifin fact all of these individuals are 
members of a single community under one government - a global state." Diane 
Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in 
Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 555, 587 (2009). Professor Ring does 
leave open the possibility in the future for a normative basis for inter-nation equity 
standing alone, based on an accepted theory of duty and obligations owed to others 
globally. See id at 585, 587, 590. 
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The equity basis for source taxation may be complicated by the fact 
that some residents of a given country will be investing or doing business in 
other countries. Thus, it may be contended that one country's failure to tax a 
nonresident for the receipt of governmental benefits can be "offset" by the 
failure of the nonresident's country to tax the other country's residents when 
they receive host country governmental benefits. One response is that 
taxpayers with purely domestic business and investment activities would not 
benefit from another country's lack of source taxation: such taxpayers would 
bear the cost of home country governmental benefits received by 
nonresidents but would not take advantage of tax-free governmental benefits 
provided by other countries. Nonetheless, a further contention may be that 
resident taxpayers with purely domestic activities would not suffer from their 
home country's lack of source taxation over nonresidents because other 
home country residents with foreign income that is free of source taxation 
would then bear a greater residence country tax burden. This is because 
without the imposition of source taxation, there would be no occasion nor 
need for a home country to provide its residents with foreign tax credits or 
foreign income exclusions, respectively.159 Thus, a home country would be 
taxing its residents with foreign income effectively as surrogates for the 
nonresidents receiving governmental benefits from the particular country. 
However, this argument assumes equal capital flows between countries, 
which would never be the case. If a given country's amount of nonresident 
investment or business activity exceeds the amount of foreign investment or 
business activity conducted by its residents, i.e., is a net capital importer, 
then its residents with purely domestic activities would not experience a 
sufficient tax offset for its country's failure to exercise source taxation over 
nonresidents. 
Notions of perceived equity bolster the equity basis for source 
taxation. Recently, some leading commentators on international taxation 
have put forth what they term as a new principle for structuring source 
taxation - the parity principle.160 In applying this principle to U.S. source 
taxation, they assert that the U.S. income tax should treat businesses owned 
by foreign taxpayers no more favorably than comparably situated U.S.-
owned businesses. 161 The basis for the parity principle is that residence 
taxation will lose legitimacy and efficacy if residents perceive that they are 
being more heavily taxed than nonresidents with equal amounts of income 
159. See Green, supra note 153, at 80 (pointing out that with international 
agreement on a residence-based tax system, the United States would collect more 
tax revenue from its residents with foreign source income because it would no longer 
yield to other countries the primary right to tax such income). 
160. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
161. Id. at 111. 
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from the residence country; 162 thus, this principle rests on perceptional equity 
concerns (along with real equity concerns).163 In applying the parity principle 
in examining a few source rules, the commentators refer to the access to the 
U.S. market, which they see as a product of government activities, as well as 
U.S. legal protections/64 indicating that the benefits principle is at the core of 
their parity principle. Consequently, their work suggests that both real and 
perceptional equity concerns support the benefits-principle basis for source 
taxation. 
2. Effect of the Ability to Pay Principle 
In contrast to source taxation, residence taxation rests on a different 
equity basis than source taxation, this being the notion of a taxpayer's ability 
to pay.165 Under residence taxation, the tax burden is allocated among 
taxpayers in a manner that reflects their relative abilities to pay.166 Because a 
taxpayer's worldwide income is usually considered the proper gauge for 
measuring a taxpayer's ability to pay, and because the ability to pay principle 
suggests that tax rates should be progressive, residence taxation is generally 
implemented by imposing a progressive tax on a taxpayer's worldwide 
income. 167 
Although it may seem as though source taxation and residence 
taxation are quite distinct, this is not the case. First, source taxation, while 
founded on the benefits principle, can be viewed as having ability-to-pay 
attributes. 168 The source tax, similar to the residence tax, is determined by 
applying tax rates to a nonresident's domestic source income. Thus, no effort 
is made to approximate the value of the benefits received by the nonresident 
from the host country's government activities that relate to the nonresident's 
income, no doubt because it would be impossible to do so with any degree of 
162. See id. 
163. Other scholars have pointed out the importance of perceptional equity. 
See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
Preference, 48 TAX L. REv. 319, 368-69 (1993). 
164. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91-92, 
142-43. 
165. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, 
Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide 
Income,5 FLA. TAX REv. 299, 306-08 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, 
Fairness). Besides equity, other considerations that are important in residence 
taxation include economic efficiency and administrability. See id. at 306-08 & n.14. 
166. See Green, supra note 153, at 29. 
167. See id. 
168. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40. 
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accuracy.169 Instead, the amount of tax that is imposed on a nonresident's 
domestic source income appears to reflect the host country's determination 
of a fair allocation of the tax burden based on the relative abilities to pay of 
all taxpayers, with nonresidents judged only on the basis of their domestic 
source income. l7o This view is buttressed by the fact that the rates that apply 
to a nonresident's domestic source business income are often progressive in 
nature.17I Thus, while the benefits principle forms the basis for, and defines 
the scope of, source taxation, the ability to pay principle appears to provide 
some role, at least in practice, in determining the amount of tax that is 
imposed on a nonresident's domestic source income. 172 
In addition, and of significance in determining principles for 
sourcing income, source taxation and residence taxation are related in that 
source taxation frustrates to an extent the ability to pay principle underlying 
residence taxation. It is standard practice, as well as an assumption of this 
Article, 1 73 that with source taxation, countries will relieve international 
double taxation either by allowing their residents a foreign tax credit or 
exempting certain foreign income from residence taxation. Where a foreign 
tax credit is allowed, the residence tax is reduced by the amount of the credit, 
whereas from the strict standpoint of measuring ability to pay, there should 
only be a deduction for foreign taxes, as is the case with other expenses of 
earning income.174 And where a residence country employs an exemption 
system to relieve double taxation, the residence country ignores completely 
the exempt foreign income in measuring the resident's ability to pay. 
Consequently, source taxation effectively diminishes the ability of a 
169. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1585 (stating that it would be impossible 
to determine precisely the amount of government benefits received by taxpayers); 
Barker, supra note 146, at 370 (stating that there is no way to measure directly the 
benefit received; instead one should develop a tax base that reflects the benefit 
received). 
170. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40. 
171. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a). 
172. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40. Whether 
this is correct as a normative matter is another issue. Some commentators are of the 
view that ability-to-pay considerations should not be used in connection with source 
taxation. Their reason is that ability to pay should be measured by reference to a 
taxpayer's total income and not just that income over which a country exercises 
taxing jurisdiction. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 94-
95. Nevertheless, these commentators endorse the determination of a nonresident's 
source tax liability by imposing graduated tax rates on a nonresident's domestic 
source, because it is a reasonable and practical measure of the host country 
government benefits received and it treats nonresidents in a nondiscriminatory 
manner versus residents. See id. at 95, 104. 
173. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
174. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at 328; Ault & 
Bradford, supra note 1, at 41. 
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residence country to equitably allocate the costs of government activities 
among its residents on their respective abilities to pay. 175 
Based on this reason, some commentators call for an end to source 
taxation in favor of exclusive residence taxation.176 Other commentators 
advocate for a modified source taxation approach under which passive 
income would be subject to exclusive residence taxation, but active income 
would continue to be subject to source taxation.177 Those supporting the 
modified source taxation approach justify the passive/active income 
distinction by pointing to the fact that international passive income is often 
earned by individuals, for whom ability to pay taxation is geared, whereas 
international active income tends to be earned by corporations, for which the 
ability to pay principle is less relevant. 178 Because these proposals call for a 
reduction (or even elimination) of source taxation, they would obviously 
greatly affect the formulation of source rules. 
The appropriateness of eliminating or reducing source taxation 
should be decided on the basis of the equitable principles involved. Source 
taxation promotes an equitable sharing of the costs of government among 
residents and nonresidents. Residence taxation advances the equitable 
allocation of the costs of government among residents based on their relative 
abilities to pay. Because source taxation frustrates residence taxation to an 
extent, the issue is which approach strikes the appropriate balance between 
these two competing types of equity. 
Exclusive residence taxation simply goes too far in favor of ability-
to-pay equity, by ignoring completely the benefits provided to nonresidents 
by the host country. I79 In addition, because exclusive residence taxation 
would result in more tax revenue for developed countries and less for 
175. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 97. Some 
commentators appear to take the position that source taxation is objectionable under 
the ability-to-pay criterion not necessarily because it interferes with residence 
taxation, but because source taxation is itself a poor way to measure ability to pay as 
it only taxes a portion of a taxpayer's worldwide income and sometimes uses gross 
basis withholding taxes. See Graetz and Grinberg, supra note 76, at 570; Green, 
supra note 153, at 29. 
176. See Green, supra note 153, at 29, 32. 
177. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A 
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, 
Simplification] . 
178. See id. at 1310--17. 
179. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME 
TAXATION 67-68 (2003) [hereinafter Graetz, FOUNDATIONS]; cf Avi-Yonah, 
Simplification, supra note 177 at 1311 (stating that the ability-to-pay argument for 
exclusive residence taxation does not explain why the home country should have the 
only claim to tax cross-border income and that based on economic allegiance, both 
countries should have taxing rights). 
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developing countries, the latter would likely refuse to cooperate in such a 
system. 180 In any event, this Article assumes that countries will continue to 
exercise source taxation.181 
While an approach that eliminates source taxation of passive income 
at least strikes a balance between the equitable principles involved, is it an 
appropriate one? Equitable determinations are fraught with value 
judgments,182 and the same is true in deciding between competing notions of 
equity. There appears to be no correct answer here. The remainder of the 
Article assumes that countries will generally agree that the equitable notions 
underlying the benefits principle are more important than those supporting 
ability-to-pay taxation where these equitable notions conflict, and that the 
benefits principle should generally dictate the scope of source taxation for 
both passive and active income. However, under the proposed sourcing 
standard (which is discussed in the next sectionI83), it would be possible to 
take ability-to-pay equity into account to some extent in determining the 
source of income;184 this can be done by increasing the portion of income 
that is sourced to the country of residence due to ability-to-pay equity 
considerations.18s 
3. Administrability 
Another principle that should guide the development of a sourcing 
standard is administrability.186 It is important for source rules to operate in a 
clear fashion and refrain from requiring difficult factual determinations on a 
case-by-case basis. 187 Both taxpayers and tax administrators need clarity and 
180. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification, supra note 177 at 1313-14. 
181. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
182. Indeed, some would assert that for purposes of the ability-to-pay 
criterion, a resident of a country who has income from foreign sources is not 
similarly situated to a resident with income only from domestic sources. See Ault & 
Bradford, supra note 1, at 41 (referring to these assertions). 
183. See infra Part IIl.e. 
184. Cj Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on 
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 588-89 (2001) (in arguing for a 
system where the United States exempts foreign income from taxation, contending 
that the United States may be justified in imposing some tax on such income because 
of the government benefits provided by the United States to U.S. corporations with 
respect to such income, along with the notion that "U.S. corporations may be 
expected to contribute to the redistributional social benefits decided upon by the 
nation's electorate"). 
185. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
186. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; TREASURY II, supra note 50, 
at 399; McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-66 to 3-67. 
187. TREASURY II, supra note 50, at 399; see McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra 
note 50, at 3-66; Andrus, supra note 42, at 842. 
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minimal uncertainty in performing their respective compliance and 
enforcement tasks. This is particularly so where the source of income 
determines whether a payer of an item is required to withhold in order to 
collect tax on an in-bound transaction. 188 
To this end, the sourcing standard, and the rules devised thereunder, 
should avoid overly refined approaches aimed at absolute precision. In 
particular, while the sourcing standard (discussed in the next section) will 
call for the division of an item of income among different sources where 
appropriate,189 this will generally be done using a bright line approach in 
order to provide clear and predictable source rules. 190 Such an approach is 
further supported by the equity basis that underlies the benefits principle, 
which, as noted above, is somewhat imprecise given the value judgments 
involved. 191 
An aspect of administrability is that a source tax must be 
enforceable. 192 It would make little sense in designating income as domestic 
source for purposes of a country's exercise of source taxation over 
nonresidents if the tax cannot be enforced because the nonresidents are not 
physically present in the host country and collection of the tax through 
withholding would not be feasible. Accordingly, enforcement should be an 
important consideration under the standard for devising source rules.193 
4. Inappropriate Principles in Developing the Sourcing Standard 
The preceding subsections have determined that connection to 
government benefits and administrability are principles that should guide the 
development of a standard for sourcing income. This subsection 
demonstrates why other principles should not be used in developing the 
sourcing standard, because they either do not appropriately relate to sourcing 
income or are not suitable for crafting source rules intended for multilateral 
adoption. 194 
188. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-66; cf ALI PROJECT I, 
supra note 14, at 36 (referring to withholding complications as a reason for not 
dividing the source of rental income where a taxpayer had produced the leased 
property). 
189. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text. 
190. Cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 842 (noting the administrative benefits of 
source rules that rely on line drawing). 
191. See supra notes 155-56, 182 and accompanying text. 
192. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 115. 
193. See Walker, supra note 47, at 6,30. 
194. In this regard, the principles underlying treaty provisions that reduce or 
eliminate source taxation on investment income can be viewed as either consistent 
with, or supplemental to, an approach for sourcing income that focuses on the 
countries that provide the taxpayer with public benefits relating to the income. To 
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a. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality 
Capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CrN) 
should be examined for their potential for providing principles for sourcing. 
While these are the key neutrality £olicies generally thought to govern the 
structure of cross-border taxation, 1 5 they apparently have little to offer in 
developing the sourcing standard.196 
CEN is satisfied when a resident pays the same total of resident 
country and foreign taxes regardless of whether the income is earned within 
or without the country of residence. 197 In this situation, a resident's decision 
to invest in the residence country or abroad is unaffected by the tax 
consequences in the residence and foreign countries. 198 Instead, the decision 
is dictated by pre-tax returns. 199 Because the location of investments is not 
affected by the income taxes, economists generally view CEN as essential 
for worldwide economic efficiency.2oo 
Whether CEN is achieved does not depend on the method used for 
dividing tax jurisdiction among countries. For example, CEN would be 
satisfied if all countries used residence taxation exc1usively.201 Alternatively, 
CEN would exist with source taxation, provided that residence countries 
taxed domestic and foreign income the same and allowed for an unlimited 
and refundable foreign tax credit.202 (It should be noted that apparently no 
the extent that these· treaty provisions reflect the view that the source country's claim 
to tax investment income is relatively weak (see supra notes 76-78 and 
accompanying text), they are conceptually consistent with the benefits principle; 
nevertheless, an evaluation of the related public benefits under the standard proposed 
in this Article may lead to different allocations of tax jurisdiction than that currently 
provided in treaties. To the extent that the treaty limitations on taxing investment 
income aim to prevent excessive source taxation, this principle can co-exist with 
harmonized source rules founded primarily on the benefits principle, by allowing for 
treaties to continue reducing the source tax rate on certain income where appropriate 
to achieve this objective. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
195. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 270-71. 
196. See GECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 13 (concluding that the 
policies of CEN or CIN do not depend in practice on whether a country should have 
source taxation rights over particular income); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source 
Rules, supra note 1, at 108-10 (stating that CEN and CIN apply without regard to 
the division of tax revenue between source and residence countries; concluding that 
the efficiency criterion offer little help in the design of source taxation). 
197. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD 
eRA WFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 20 (2011). 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 270. 
201. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 108. 
202. See id. 
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country allows for an unlimited foreign tax credii03). On the other hand, 
CEN is not satisfied where a residence country uses a territorial system that 
exempts foreign income (assuming that foreign tax rate differs from the rate 
applied by the residence country on domestic source income), and this would 
be true regardless of how income is sourced for these purposes. Thus, with 
source taxation, whether or not CEN is satisfied depends primarily on 
methods used by resident countries for mitigating double taxation.204 
Nevertheless, CEN does support measures to reduce opportunities for cross-
crediting, so that taxpayers will not have a tax incentive to invest in activities 
generating low-taxed foreign income as opposed to domestic income.205 And, 
as discussed above/06 a way of combating cross-crediting is to treat income 
as domestic source where a foreign country is not expected to tax the 
income. However, as pointed out below/07 this expected-to-tax principle is 
not relevant in designing source rules intended for multilateral adoption by 
countries.208 
CIN exists when the total tax that is paid on income earned in a 
country is determined without regard to the residence of the taxpayer?09 
Thus, CIN requires that all firms operating in a particular country be taxed at 
the same rate, whether the firms are domestically or foreign owned.2IO Where 
CIN holds, the worldwide allocation of savings is efficient because all savers 
receive the same after-tax returns.2lI 
Upon initial examination, it would seem that similar to CEN, CIN is 
concerned only with the overall structure of international taxation. Thus, it is 
often stated that CIN would exist where countries employed territorial tax 
regimes that exempted foreign source income.212 Under such a structure, only 
the source country would be taxing income from activities or investments 
within a given country, thus resulting in the same level of taxation for all 
taxpayers with income from that country. 
On closer inspection, however, CIN does have something to say 
about the design of source rules. For CIN to exist, source countries and 
residence countries must apply the same source rules in determining the 
203. See id; Graetz, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 179, at 27. 
204. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 109. 
205. See Graetz, Inadequate PrinCiples, supra note 97, at 271. 
206. See supra notes 6~3 and accompanying text. 
207. See infra Part III.B.4.b. 
208. Moreover, cross-crediting can also be addressed by having separate 
foreign tax credit limitations for different categories of foreign source income, as 
contained in section 904(d). See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 413-
23. 
209. See id. at 21. 
210. See id. 
211. See Graetz, Inadequate PrinCiples, supra note 97, at 271. 
212. See id. 
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income to tax and exempt, respectively. Moreover, even with the uniform 
source rules, CIN would be violated if residence-based source rules were 
used. For example, assume that all countries sourced income from electronic 
commerce according to the residence of the taxpayer rather than the location 
of the sales activity or the destination ofthe items sold. Under this rule, sales 
by e-commerce sellers would be treated as domestic source for purposes of 
residence country taxation and exempt income for purposes of source 
taxation. Further assume that Country A imposes a 40 percent tax, Country B 
imposes a 30 percent tax, and Country C imposes a 20 percent tax. In these 
circumstances, a resident of Country C who is selling goods electronically 
into Country C would be taxed at 20 percent (the Country C rate), whereas a 
Country B resident performing the same activity would be taxed at 30 
percent (the Country B rate). Assume that for both sellers all activities 
related to these electronic sales (such as maintaining a web site) occur in 
Country A. Thus, CIN is violated because the two sellers are not subject to 
the same tax on income that is earned through performing electronic sales 
activities in Country A and accessing the Country C market.213 
Consequently, CIN dictates that residence-based methods not be used to 
source income. However, as to whether the income should be sourced 
according to the location of the seller's activities or the location of the 
market (or a combination of both), CIN provides no guidance: as long as all 
countries apply the same source rule, taxpayers resident in different countries 
will be subject to the same rate of taxation with respect to operations in the 
same country or countries. 
While CIN does provide some guidance for designing source rules, 
CIN is not the generally accepted neutrality standard214 and consequently 
does not seem to be an appropriate guide for crafting source rules intended 
for multilateral adoption by countries.215 Economists generally favor CEN 
over CIN because distortions in the investment locations are considered to be 
more costly than distortions in the savings allocation216 (and it is practically 
213. See infra note 244-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
sourcing income based on accessing a country's market. 
214. See Jane G. Gravelle, Congo Research Serv., Reform of u.s. 
International Taxation: Alternatives 7 (2010) (concluding that "capital import 
'neutrality' is not neutral at all"). 
215. Moreover, commentators have asserted that CIN has little or no 
relevance to the taxation of portfolio income, because taxing such income has no 
effect on the abilities of companies from different nations to compete against one 
another in a particular country. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 558-59. 
216. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 272. Moreover, as 
a practical matter, CIN is often rejected as an objective compared to CEN and 
national neutrality, given that many national policies of individual countries affect 
the return to savings. See James R. Hines, Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign 
Income, 62 TAX L. REv. 269, 273-74 (2009). Nevertheless, economists may still 
2011] Sourcing Income Among Nations 603 
impossible to achieve CEN and CIN simultaneously).2I7 Consequently, it is 
unlikely that countries would generally agree to adhere to CIN, which would 
be necessary for them to want to use it as a principle for designing source 
rules. For these reasons, CIN should not inform the development of the 
sourcing standard.218 
advocate territorial taxation based on a "second best" efficiency argument, as well as 
asserted simplicity and revenue raising benefits. See Gravelle, supra note 214, at 13-
14 (referring to proposals advancing these arguments, but not subscribing to such 
views). 
217. To do so would require uniform income tax bases and tax rates for all 
countries, or a worldwide government. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra 
note 97, at 272. 
218. Capital ownership neutrality (CON), a relatively recent neutrality 
policy, should also be considered for providing principles for developing the 
sourcing standard. CON requires that international tax rules not distort the identities 
of the owners of capital. See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22 (citing 
to Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 
NAT'L TAX J. 487 (2003)). According to its proponents, CON can be achieved if all 
countries adopted territorial tax systems. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 8 
& n.4; Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22. Alternatively, CON can be 
met if all countries adopted worldwide tax systems with foreign tax mechanisms. 
See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 8 n.4; Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra 
note 197, at 22. In short, CON calls for conformity among countries in the method of 
double tax relief. See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22; cf. Mitchell 
A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortion, and International Tax 
Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53, 73-78 (2006) [hereinafter Kane, 
Ownership ] (characterizing the prescription of CON in this fashion but not agreeing 
that non-mixed systems for providing double tax relief necessarily result in 
ownership efficiency). CON would appear to offer no principles for the design of 
multilateral source rules for use in either worldwide or territorial tax systems. This is 
because with worldwide tax systems coupled with foreign tax credit mechanisms, 
CON should be satisfied regardless of particular source rules. With territorial tax 
systems, CON should be satisfied as long as countries use uniform source rules. 
And, unlike the case for achieving CIN, it should not matter that such source rules 
employ residence-based sourcing approaches, as the key in achieving CON is the 
global consensus in the form of double tax relief Moreover, even if CON did 
provide principles for developing multilateral source rules, like CIN, CON does not 
appear to be the generally accepted neutrality standard. See Gravelle, supra note 214, 
at 10 ("In light of the many ways in which the efficiency costs of capital ownership 
non-neutrality are unlikely to be significant compared to location distortions, it 
seems questionable to use meeting this standard of neutrality to evaluate tax reform 
changes."); Kane, Ownership, supra, at 56 (arguing that CON is not an appropriate 
benchmark for determining international tax policy given the many factors that 
distort ownership patterns). 
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b. Expectation that Another Country Will Be Taxing the 
Income 
As mentioned previously, another principle that is sometimes used to 
source income is whether it is expected that other countries will be taxing the 
income.219 The concern underlying this principle is international under 
taxation. That is, if income is included in calculating a residence country's 
foreign tax credit limitation, but the income is not taxed by another country, 
the taxpayer would be able to cross-credit excess foreign tax credits on other 
foreign income against the pre-credit residence country tax on the income, 
thus effectively resulting in no or reduced overall tax on the income?20 
Similarly, if the residence country uses a territorial system, exempting 
income that is not taxed by another country would mean that no country is 
taxing the income. 
The expected-to-tax principle is simply not relevant to the design of 
sourc.e rules in light of the following objectives of this Article - that the 
sourcing standard should produce source rules that are the same for 
countries' taxation of both in-bound transactions by nonresidents and out-
bound transactions by residents, and that the source rules fonn the basis for 
countries' exercise of taxing jurisdiction. With the same source rules being 
applied by countries for taxing inbound and outbound transactions, the 
concern that underlies the expected-to-tax principle should not be present: 
income that is treated as foreign source for purposes of a taxpayer's home 
country foreign tar- credit will be treated as domestic source and thereby be 
taxable by the host country.221 Consequently, the expected-to-tax principle 
should be discarded in the design of multilateral source rules.222 
c. National Interests 
Finally, the national interests of particular countries should not be 
considered as relevant factors in developing the sourcing standard. In this 
219. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
221. Of course, even with the general adoption of the sourcing scheme 
proposed by this Article, there will always be outlier countries. However, assuming 
that they are in the distinct minority, then in the vast majority of cases the concern 
underlying the expected-to-tax principle would not be present (because the vast 
majority of countries will be using consistent rules), and thus this principle need not 
be used in formulating source rules. If the proposed sourcing approach is not 
generally adopted, then it should not be used because of the high degree of double 
taxation and non-taxation that is likely to result. See infra notes 333-35 and 
accompanying text. 
222. See supra note 88 for problems under current law with source rules 
based on this principle. 
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regard, some prominent commentators assert that U.S. national interests 
should dictate the structure of U.S. international income tax rules.223 
Fostering national interests may be a proper consideration in contexts where 
it is not critical whether countries use harmonized approaches for taxing 
international income. For example, it would appear that no great harm results 
where some countries tax their residents on the basis of worldwide income 
subject to the allowance of foreign tax credits, while other countries employ 
exemptions systems under which certain foreign income is excluded from 
home country taxation. Consequently, in deciding among these overall 
structures for taxing international income, it would appear that countries may 
appropriately take into account national concerns such as the economic well-
being of their own residents. However, where source rules vary among 
countries, there is the potential for double or under taxation. For this reason, 
this Article seeks to develop rules that are suitable for international 
acceptance,224 and universal agreement wi11likely not be reached on source 
rules that are designed to serve the national interests of one or more 
nations.225 
Accordingly, source rules suitable for multilateral adoption should 
avoid features aimed at Eromoting national interests, such as the title passage 
rule for inventory sales 26 and the portfolio interest exemption.227 It may be 
223. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 277-82 (framing 
the inquiry as what international income tax rules will enhance the economic well-
being of u.s. citizens and residents); Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 538 
(asking what income tax policy for taxing foreign portfolio investments serves the 
United States' interest); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 97-
98 (in evaluating the structure of U.S. source taxation, asserting that "the primary 
obligation of U.S. tax policy is to improve the well-being ... of U.S. individuals"). 
224. See Musgrave, supra note 132, at 1344 (calling for cooperative rules 
among nations for the division of the tax base and tax rates); OECD, E-Commerce, 
supra note 107, at 25 (stressing the need for universal agreement of rules for 
allocating taxing rights over business profits in order to prevent double taxation or 
non-taxation). 
225. Cf Musgrave, supra note 132, at 1348 (noting that the national 
interests of countries may conflict with each other). 
226. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In this regard, 
commentators assert that the foreign tax credit and the source rules used for purposes 
of limiting the credit should be focused on mitigating the double taxation of foreign 
income and "should not be designed to subsidize foreign investment, favor or 
disfavor particular types of investment, or serve nonrevenue raising foreign policy 
objectives." See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 149. 
Commentators have used tax expenditure analysis to demonstrate that the title 
passage rule as applied to U.S. export sales is an inappropriate and ineffective 
subsidy for such sales activities; these commentators accordingly recommend that 
the title passage rule for export sales be repealed, and that the source of income from 
export sales be determined using an approach that more clearly reflects the location 
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contended that such deviations from the benefits principle whereby countries 
give up tax revenue228 in order to promote national interests are benign from 
the standpoint of achieving universal agreement: countries not employing 
such features may simply not care because the effect would be under-
taxation borne by another country as opposed to potential double taxation of 
a country's residents. However, other countries may object because such 
measures may harm their own national interests - for example, the title 
passage rule may provide a U.s. exporter with a competitive advantage vis a 
vis companies operating in the importing country. Similarly, while the 
portfolio interest exemption stimulates the provision of foreign capital,229 
capital-importing countries, in particular developing nations, stand to lose 
tax revenue to capital-exporting countries (i.e., developed nations) from 
source tax exemptions for interest and other types of portfolio income.23o 
of the underlying economic activities. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, 
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. 
TAX REv. 437, 551-61 (2008). 
227. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Other commentators also 
have proposed repealing the portfolio interest exemption, albeit for reasons that 
differ from those advanced in this Article. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Memo to 
Congress: It's Time to Repeal the U.S. Portfolio Interest Exemption, 17 TAX NOTES 
INT'L 1817 (1998) (proposing that Congress repeal the portfolio interest exemption 
and instead enact a high withholding tax "on interest and other deductible payments 
to nonresidents" that would "be completely refundable on proof that the income ... 
has been reported to the tax authorities" in the beneficial owner's country of 
residence; basing this proposal on the assertion that the factors that led to the 
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption no longer exist and that the exemption 
has led to the situation where most cross-border portfolio income is not being taxed 
by any jurisdiction, which is "unacceptable from an efficiency [or] equity 
perspective"); Michael J. McIntyre, Guidelines for Taxing International Capital 
Flows: The Legal Perspective, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 315, 317 (1993) [hereinafter 
McIntyre, Guidelines] (recommending that countries harmonize their withholding 
taxes on capital income at some positive rate and that the United States should take 
the first step towards this end by imposing a low-rate withholding tax on all interest 
payments; basing this proposal on the need to mitigate competitive pressures that 
undermine countries' imposition of income taxes and to raise revenue). 
228. With the title passage rule, the United States is surrendering some 
residence taxation; with the portfolio interest exemptions, countries are surrendering 
some source taxation. 
229. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. Cf Peter R. Merrill, et 
aI, Tax Treaties in a Global Economy: The Case for Zero Withholding on Direct 
Dividends, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 1387, 1388-89 (1992) ("[I]t generally is in every 
country's self interest to seek reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes. "). 
230. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of 
u.s. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1033-34 (1997) ("Capital-
exporting and capital-importing nations have conflicting financial interests: capital 
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And developing nations usually struggle between their tax revenue and 
foreign capital needs.231 Thus, countries not favoring source exemptions for 
portfolio income may well object if the sourcing standard permits such 
exemptions, because these countries would then be at a competitive 
disadvantage in attracting foreign capital if they were to impose a source tax 
on portfolio income.232 Moreover, permitting deviations from the benefits 
principle sets a precedent whereby countries may feel justified in varying 
their source rules where it suits their national interests, and some such 
measures may indeed result in instances of double taxation, thereby 
frustrating the goals of a universal sourcing standard.233 
C. Standard for Sourcing Income 
The previous section has determined that the sourcing standard 
should be developed according to the following two principles: (i) sourcing 
income based on the countries that provide the taxpayer with public benefits 
importers have the most to gain from taxation at source, capital exporters from 
taxation of residents. "). 
231. Keinan, supra note 72, at 66; see Reuven S. A vi-Y onah, Globalization, 
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REv. 
1573, 1639-48 (2000) [Hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Globalization]. In this regard, 
commentators have warned that "[t]he resulting fiscal sacrifice [by developing 
countries from source tax exemptions] is likely to exceed by far the potential benefits 
reSUlting from new investment capital." Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Revenge 
of the Source Countries, Part III: Source as Fiction, 40 TAX NOTES Int'l 219, 224 
(2005) (quoting from a report given by Angel Schindel and Adolfo Atchabahian at 
the September 12-16, 2005, International Fiscal Association World Congress in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina). Consequently, there is "a growing awareness that the 
sensible approach for developing countries is to withhold" tax on payments of 
portfolio income to foreign investors. Id; see Cockfield, supra note 84, at 176 
(pointing out that many developing nations prefer the provisions contained in the 
United Nations model tax treaty, which enhance source taxation); cf OECD Model 
2008, supra note 78, at Positions on Article 10 (Dividends) and Its Commentary, 
Positions on Article 11 (Interest) and Its Commentary, Positions on Article 12 
(Royalties) and Its Commentary (several developing countries reserving their 
positions on deviating from the OECD treaty rates for dividends, interest, and 
royalties); but cf Keinan, supra note 72, at 676 (contending that although residency 
taxation of financial transaction income "would shift revenue from developing 
countries to developed countries in the short-run," it would benefit developing 
countries in the long-run). 
232. With only some countries taxing portfolio income, it can be expected 
that most of the tax would be shifted to the borrower in the form of higher interest 
payments. See McIntyre, Guidelines, supra note 227, at 317. 
233. For example, a country that wants to curb imports may enact a source 
rule that results in more domestic source income than that prescribed by the 
multilateral sourcing standard. 
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that relate to the income and (ii) administrability. This section uses these 
principles to develop a standard that can be used to derive particular source 
rules. As a first step in developing the standard, it is important to describe in 
some detail the types of public benefits that countries provide. 
1. Categorizing and Describing Governmental Benefits that Relate 
to Income 
Taxpayers receive numerous governmental benefits that relate to 
their earning and enjoyment of income. The locations where such 
governmental benefits are provided can be grouped into three categories: the 
situs of the activities giving rise to income; the destination of the property, 
capital, or services giving rise to income; and the residence of the person 
receiving income. Each of these is examined below. 
a. Countries Where Taxpayer Conducts Activities 
Numerous public benefits arise from government services that are 
provided in countries where taxpayers conduct income-producing activities. 
Included among these public benefits are physical infrastructure (e.g., roads 
and telecommunications), economic infrastructure (e.g., banking systems), 
legal infrastructure (e.g., court systems and regulatory agencies), public 
safety, national security, and a skilled workforce?34 These products of 
government activities are either essential for, or contribute greatly to, the 
capacity of taxpayers to carry on activities in the particular country. As 
discussed previously,235 the receipt of these government benefits justifies a 
source tax, and thus the location of these benefits should serve as a basis for 
sourcing income. Indeed, several of the current source rules determine the 
source of income based on the location of the economic activities giving rise 
to the income, which can be viewed as a surrogate for the location of the 
public benefits provided; these include the rules for sourcing service 
income236 and manufacturing income.237 
b. Countries in Which Taxpayer Provides Property, 
Capital, or Services 
Where a taxpayer provides property, capital, or services into a 
country, the country of destination is providing the taxpayer with 
governmental benefits that relate to the earning of income. This is most 
234. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90. 
235. See supra Part I1I.B.I. 
236. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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easily understood in the fonn of legal protections provided by a destination 
country to a taxpayer in connection with royalties received for licensing 
patents, copyrights, or other intangibles for use in that country.238 In this 
regard, the source rules typically source royalty income based on the location 
of the legal protections.239 Destination countries provide other public benefits 
to taxpayers as well. For example, when a taxpayer is providing capital to a 
corporation, both the country ( or countries) where the corporation conducts 
activities as well as the country under whose laws the corporation is fonned 
are providing benefits that contribute to the taxpayer's ability to receive 
dividend income and stock gains; the fonner country provides benefits in 
support of the corporation's activities and the latter country provides the 
legal infrastructure that protects and regulates the taxpayer's investment in 
the corporation.240 Current U.S. law recognizes both types of public benefits 
in sourcing dividend income, with dividends generally sourced according to 
the corporation's country of incorporation, but with exceptions that look to 
the place of substantial business activity conducted by the company.241 
Similarly, a taxpayer who loans money indirectly profits from the public 
benefits received by the borrower in connection with the borrower's income-
producing activities, which provide the borrower with funds to pay interest to 
the taxpayer.242 The current U.S. source rule is generally in accord with this 
view, as it sources interest income based on the residence (in the case of non-
corporate borrowers) or country of incorporation (in the case of corporate 
borrowers) of the debtor, unless the debtor has substantial business activities 
or a banking branch outside its country of residence or incorporation.243 
In addition, the country of destination provides significant public 
benefits by perfonning the governmental services essential for establishing a 
market for a taxpayer's goods and services.244 The market in any country 
238. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, 
Source Rules, supra note 1, at 143; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 
240-41. 
239. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
240. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 63. 
241. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
242. Cf Lokken, Source, supra note 49, at 7 (stating that under a benefits-
based model for sourcing income, "interest originates where the borrower utilizes the 
borrowed funds because governmental services and protections at that location are 
central to the success of the borrower's venture, which generates the capacity to pay 
interest on the loan"); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 67 (stating that the general 
principle under the current source rules for interest appears to be that the interest is 
sourced in the country that is reasonably presumed to be the place where the 
borrower derives the income or wealth that funds the interest payments). 
243. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
244. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91; Avi-
Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 540; cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note 
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could not exist without the necessary physical, economic, and legal 
infrastructure, and this is largely a result of governmental functions?45 And 
by accessing a country's market through the sale of goods and services, a 
taxpayer is benefiting from these governmental activities, thus justifying a 
source tax to some degree on the income earned. While current U.S. law 
does not appear to recognize market access as a basis for sourcing income,z46 
several leading commentators advocate that the United States should tax 
nonresidents as a charge for exploiting the U.S. market,z47 and other notable 
analysts view market access as a legitimate basis for exercising source 
taxation in genera1.248 
14, at 20 (stating that it might be appropriate to source income from the sale of 
inventory in the country in which the purchaser is located, because it is the country 
that "has provided the market for the property sold"). 
245. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91; cf 
OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 14 (some members of the Technical 
Advisory Group studying the taxation of electronic commerce concluding that 
source taxation of a supplier not physically present in a market country is justified 
because the business profits derive partly from the use of the country's 
infrastructure, such as "means oftransportation (such as roads), public safety, a legal 
system that ensure the protection of property rights and a financial infrastructure"). 
246. An exception to this may be the source rule for international 
communications income that is earned by U.S. persons, which treats 50 percent of 
such income as foreign source, possibly because the U.S. person is viewed as having 
accessed a foreign country's market by transmitting communications or data to that 
country. See I.R.C. § 863(e). While not based on the market access rationale, the title 
passage rule that applies under U.S. law for inventory sales can produce a source 
designation that is consistent with a market access approach. For example, where 
inventory is sold into a foreign country with title passing to the buyer in that country, 
the income will be foreign source. Of course, sales into the foreign country can also 
generate U.S. income if title to the goods passes in the United States. In any event, 
simply selling inventory into a country is not likely to result in a source tax in the 
absence of some other business activity in that country (and possibly a fixed place of 
business if a treaty applies). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
247. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91. 
248. See Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 540; cf 
Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 299 (stating that countries that 
supply only a market for goods and services may have a basis for exercising source 
taxation). In this regard, the OECD Technical Advisory Group that was established 
to address the taxation of electronic commerce could not reach an agreement as to 
whether or not a supplier that is not physically present in a country may be viewed as 
using that country's economic and legal infrastructure so as to justify source taxation 
ofa portion of the enterprise's profits. See OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 
14. 
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c. Country Where Taxpayer Resides 
The taxpayer's country of residence provides public benefits that 
relate to the taxpayer's earning and enjoyment of income. Specifically, the 
residence country contributes to the ability of a taxpayer to acquire and 
protect the wealth arising from income by providing a legal system that 
governs rights and obligations.249 These public benefits include the creation 
of a court system and the regulation of financial markets and commercial 
activity. Moreover, through military protection and agencies that are 
responsible for relationships with other nations, a country is providing 
services that protect its residents' financial interests in other countries.250 For 
income that is consumed by individuals, the residence country provides 
important governmental benefits to the individual that relate to 
consumption;251 one would be unable to spend and consume income within a 
given country in the absence of the governmental services that support 
physical, legal, and economic infrastructure as well as public safety.252 
249. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1554 (noting property protection among 
the governmental benefits provided by a country to its residents); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens 7 (Univ. of Michigan Law School Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 190, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578272 [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Case Against] (pointing 
out that U.S. residents benefit from the rule of law and government protection, 
among other government benefits); McLure, supra note 153, at 149 (finding it more 
appropriate that the residence country rather than the source country should have the 
right to tax the normal return to capital because "the residence country creates the 
economic climate favorable to the creation of portfolio capital by practicing public 
fiscal virtue and by nourishing private thrift" (quoting from GARY CLYDE 
HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 
67 (1992)); cf Zelinsky, supra note 146, at 1316 (concluding that the extensive civil 
and social rights of U.S. residents may justify taxing their worldwide incomes under 
a benefit theory). 
250. See Roin, supra note 184, at 588-89 (pointing out that countries may 
assist their residents in the event of military or political instability as well as trade 
disputes); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 443, 472-73 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch, Taxing Citizens]. More specifically, 
the United States has entered into dozens of Bilateral Investment Treaties, which 
provide U.S. citizens and corporations basic protection for their business operations 
and investments in other countries. Id at 473. 
251. See Harris, supra note 137, at 447; cf Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 
76, at 569 (noting that because countries fund government services that provide for 
the well-being of their residents, countries seem to deserve priority in taxing the 
foreign portfolio income of their residents). 
252. See Jefferson VanderWolk, The Deferral Debate and the Benefits 
Theory, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 1469, 1470 (2000) [hereinafter VanderWolk, Benefits 
Theory] (stating that the residence country provides consumption-related services 
that support individuals' ability to enjoy income); cf Avi-Yonah, Case Against, 
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To an extent, current law appears to recognize the benefits provided 
by the residence country in assigning jurisdiction to tax. For example, 
although the U.S. rules generally source interest income according to the 
residence of the borrower/53 most interest paid by U.S. persons to 
nonresidents is exempt from U.S. tax under the portfolio interest 
exemption.254 While the stated reason for this exemption is to allow U.S. 
borrowers the opportunity to participate in the Eurobond market/55 the 
notion that the resident country has a greater right to tax such interest may 
also playa role?56 More generally, treaties usually assign the right to tax 
interest and royalties to the residence countri57 and significantly reduce the 
rate of source taxation on dividends?58 Again, although the prevention of 
excessive source taxation is an important reason for these treaty 
provisions,259 they also seem to reflect a determination that the residence 
country has the greater taxing rights over these types of income,26o or that at 
least tax jurisdiction should be shared between the residence and source 
countries. 
2. Unifying the Activities, Destination, and Residence Approaches 
for Sourcing Income 
a. The Benefits Principle and the Propriety of Split 
Sourcing 
As discussed above, several countries may be providing 
governmental benefits to a taxpayer that relate to the taxpayer's income, with 
these countries grouped into three categories - location of activities; 
supra note 249, at 7 (pointing out the U.S. residents benefit from the "many 
opportunities of a free market economy"). 
253. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(l). 
254. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 88l(c). Many developed countries likewise 
exempt interest paid to nonresidents. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 194. 
255. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
256. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21 at 194 (providing as a possible 
explanation for the portfolio interest exemption that the source country's claim to tax 
interest received by a nonresident may be considered to be weak); Graetz & 
Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569 (stating that the source country's claim to tax 
portfolio income is more attenuated than its claim to tax business income and that 
the claims of the residence country seem to deserve priority in the inter-nation 
allocation of tax jurisdiction over portfolio income; pointing out that primary 
allocation of taxing rights over portfolio income reflects this priority). 
257. See supra notes 22, 28 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 76-78. 
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destination of property, capital, or services; and country of residence. In 
many situations, more than one country in different categories may provide 
benefits. For example, a taxpayer who resides in one country may receive 
dividends from a corporation that is incorporated and does business in 
another country. In this situation, there are governmental benefits relating to 
the income provided by both the residence country (where the taxpayer 
resides) and the destination country (where the corporation is incorporated 
and does business, which is the destination of the taxpayer's invested 
capital). In fact, for a given item of income, countries in all three categories 
may provide benefits. For example, a taxpayer who resides in one country 
may develop an intangible in another country and license the intangible for 
use in a third country. Here, the taxpayer is receiving public benefits from 
the residence country, the activities country (where the intangible is 
developed), and the destination country (where the intangible is being used). 
Current law addresses such situations by sourcing all of the income to one of 
the countries involved.261 Thus, in the first situation, all of the dividends are 
sourced to the country of destination despite the public benefits that are also 
provided in the residence country.262 And in the second situation, all of the 
royalties are sourced to the destination country even though all three 
. b fi· h 263 countrIes are ene Ihng t e taxpayer. 
The current approach apparently is to choose the country to which 
the income primarily relates. 264 However, this can sometime lead to arbitrary 
determinations;265 it is not always clear which of the countries is the greatest 
contributor to the income in question. More fundamentally, the current 
"single source" approach is inappropriate given that often more than one 
country is providing significant public benefits. Furthermore, an approach 
that seeks to determine the primary country that is providing public benefits 
can lead to disagreements among nations,266 and thus does not appear 
suitable for multilateral adoption. 
Instead, a unified approach is called for, one that recognizes those 
countries that provide significant public benefits that relate to the income. 
Accordingly, this Article proposes that multilateral source rules be devised 
pursuant to a standard that evaluates income for sourcing on the basis of 
three factors: the destination of the services, property, or capital giving rise 
261. See, e.g., supra notes 19-20,25-27 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
264. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 242-43; ALI 
PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18 (stating that the current source rules used in the 
United States and elsewhere are result of a process that seems ''to require a balancing 
of the strength of conflicting claims and considerations as they apply to particular 
types of income"). 
265. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591. 
266. See supra notes 11 ~ 16 and accompanying text. 
614 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 11:7 
to income; the location(s) of the activities giving rise to income; and the 
residence of the person receiving income.267 Each of these countries has the 
potential for contributing significantly to the earning and enjoyment of 
income, as demonstrated above268 and as reflected in the current source 
rules.269 Under this standard, a given item of income may have its source 
267. Cf Azam, supra note 132, at 30-31 (proposing that source rules for 
taxing electronic commerce be developed by taking into account the locations of 
producers, consumers, and other physical facilities and components that contribute to 
e-commerce income, so that the tax pie can be divided fairly among countries). 
These factors, and the bases for them, are conceptually consistent with the idea of 
economic allegiance for determining the tax jurisdiction of countries that was 
developed by four prominent economists in their seminal report for the League of 
Nations. See Economic and Financial Commission, League of Nations, Report on 
Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, 
Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73F.19 
(1923). In determining the meaning of economic allegiance, the report identified four 
fundamental considerations: (i) the acquisition of wealth, (ii) the location of wealth, 
(iii) the enforceability of the rights to wealth, and (iv) the consumption of wealth. Id. 
at 22-23. Corresponding to these considerations are four points that are significant in 
determining the appropriate place of taxation: (i) the place of origin of wealth, (ii) 
the situs of wealth, (iii) the place of enforcement of the rights to wealth, and (iv) 
residence or domicile. Id. at 23. The report concludes that of the four, the place of 
wealth origin and residence or domicile of the taxpayer are the most important, with 
the other two factors mostly significant in reinforcing the tax claims of the country 
of origin or domicile. Id. at 25. In examining the origin of wealth with respect to the 
human relations that help create wealth, the report discusses the places where 
activities such as management occur as well as "[t]he selling end, that is, the place 
where agents for selling ply their calling and where the actual markets are to be 
found." Id. at 24. And in applying the economic allegiance criteria to real estate 
mortgages, the report views the place of wealth origin as where the land is located, 
apparently embracing an approach that determines origin in this context based on the 
destination of the loaned capital. See id. at 34-35; but cf id. at 36 (in evaluating the 
origin of income on corporate shares, the report favors the place where the owners of 
the corporation, i.e., the shareholders, reside, as opposed to the place where the 
corporation earns the dividends, especially because determining the location of the 
underlying corporate earnings would be complicated where the corporation has 
production, sales, or a chief office in more than one country). Thus, similar to the 
factors identified in this Article, the League of Nations report focuses on where the 
taxpayer resides and where wealth is produced, with the latter apparently taking into 
account both the activities giving rise to income along with the destination of the 
products or capital in some cases. 
268. See supra notes 234-35, 238, 240, 242, 244-45, 249-52 and 
accompanying text. 
269. See supra notes 236-37, 239, 241, 243, 253-58 and accompanying 
text; cf Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 231, at 1586-87 (pointing out that 
three types of jurisdictions may, under current rules, impose a tax on cross-border 
sales of goods or provision of services: both the supply and demand jurisdictions 
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divided among multiple locations.27o Thus, in the second example above,271 a 
portion of the royalty income would be sourced to the residence country, the 
activities country, and the destination country. Subsection 3, below, 
discusses the specifics of assigning income portions.272 
b. Defending the Residence Country Source Portion 
F or the most part, commentators appear to view a split-sourcing 
approach as appropriate from the standpoint of the benefits principle.273 The 
may impose a source tax, and the residence jurisdiction may impose residual tax that 
is not taxed by the supply or demand jurisdictions). 
270. Cj Kevin A. Bell, Indian Official Says Source Country Should Have 
Greater Taxing Rights, INT'L TAX MON., Feb. 26, 2008 (Indian official quoted as 
stating that the source country and residence country should each have the right to 
tax one half of certain income that originates in India). 
271. See supra text accompanying note 261. 
272. As voiced by a leading commentator, a concern with the functioning of 
source rules is the potential for taxpayers to erode completely their effect in a given 
jurisdiction by making deductible payments to related parties located in a second, 
low tax jurisdiction. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income 62-63 (USC Legal 
Studies Research PaperNo. 11-6,2011), http://ssrn.comlabstract=1791769 ("Even if 
a multinational enterprise's income is sourced in the first instance by every country 
according to some economically rational set of agreed-upon principles, stateless 
income tax planning simply extracts the income from the source country (for 
example, through deductible interest, royalty, or fee payments) and deposits it in a 
tax-friendlier locale."). This concern is based on the assumption that the deductible 
payments in the first jurisdiction are not subject to a source tax in that jurisdiction. 
See id. at 15. Under the proposed sourcing standard, this should not be the case if, as 
the commentator assumes (see id. at 62-63), the first jurisdiction is the destination of 
services or an intangible and is not a tax haven - in these circumstances, a portion 
of the deductible payments would be sourced and taxed in the first jurisdiction. 
273. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 35-36, 48 (stating that it 
seems anomalous to assign all of the rental income from leasing tangible property 
produced by the taxpayer to the country of use; noting that conceptually royalty 
payments received on the license of intangible property developed by the taxpayer 
represent income generated by both the creation and exploitation of the intangible); 
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 242 (acknowledging that with 
regard to royalty income received from the license of intangible property developed 
by the taxpayer, both the country that was the situs of development activities and the 
country where the intangible is used provide important services and protections); 
Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 20-21 (stating that a highly 
analytical approach for determining the source of service income might attribute the 
income to one or more jurisdictions, each of the contacts with which provides an 
economically defensible basis for determining source). 
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major concerns with such an approach are administration274 and coordination 
among countries,275 which are addressed in the next subsection. However, 
some leading commentators would probably take issue with sourcing a 
portion of income to the country of residence. With regard to U.S. source 
taxation, they assert that where a nonresident is doing business in the United 
States (or possibly accessing the U.S. market), the public benefits provided 
by the United States to the nonresident are quite similar to the public benefits 
provided to residents, thus Justifying a source tax that is equivalent to that 
imposed on U.S. residents. 76 These commentators also are concerned that 
U.S. residents would perceive a lower tax for nonresidents as inequitable, 
and thus damage the legitimacy and efficacy of the residence tax.277 The 
commentators specifically disagree with other analysts,278 who argue that 
nonresidents should pay a lower tax than residents on income earned in a 
particular country because the nonresidents are receiving fewer public 
benefits from that country.279 
274. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 36, 48 (pointing out 
administrative difficulties of splitting the source of rental income received from 
leasing tangible property produced by the taxpayer; pointing out administrative 
difficulties of splitting the source of royalty income received from licensing 
intangible property developed by the taxpayer); Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra 
note 57, at 242-43 (pointing out administrative difficulties of splitting the source of 
royalty income received from licensing intangible property developed by the 
taxpayer); cf Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 21 (stating that 
the U.S. source rule for service income, which looks to the place where services are 
performed, is probably based primarily on administrative considerations). 
275. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37, 48 (stating that no case 
has been found in which a country divides the source of rental income between the 
place where the leased property was produced and the place where it is being used; 
noting that few if any countries divide the source of royalty income between the 
place where the licensed property was developed and the place where it is being 
used). 
276. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90-91; cf 
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239 (asserting that consumer 
benefits received by individuals are not related to the issue of source of income). 
277. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
278. See id. at 90-91. 
279. See Harris, supra note 137, at 457 (the rate of tax on nonresidents with 
domestic income should be less than that on residents with domestic income, 
"because nonresidents deriving domestic income receive less government services 
than residents deriving such income, i.e., they are not in receipt of residence or 
consumption services from the domestic government"); VanderWolk, Benefits 
Theory, supra note 252, at 1470 (arguing that the taxation offoreign-source business 
income should be divided more or less equally between the residence country and 
the source country because of the governmental services provided by each country); 
Jefferson VanderWolk, Direct Taxation in the Internet Age: A Fundamentalist 
Approach, BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Apr. 2000, at 173, 179 
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This criticism is not warranted. First and foremost, assigning a 
portion of income to the residence country is in accord with the benefits 
principle.280 Because a resident benefits from home country government 
activities with respect to income that is either accumulated or consumed, the 
residence country should have a primary right to tax at least a portion of 
income that is derived from activities or market access that occurs outside of 
that country.281 This in tum should reduce the income over which the 
countries of activities and destination should have a right to taX,z82 To 
support this proposition, consider the case of an individual who resides in 
(proposing an approach under which the tax rate on the local-source income of 
nonresidents is lower than the rate on residents' income, because nonresidents 
receive less governmental benefits than residents - nonresidents "receive only 
production services, not consumption services"); cf Roin, supra note 184, at 591 
(stating that "[a] case may be made for imposing a lower tax on the U.S. income of 
foreign corporations than on the U.S. income of domestic corporations," because 
foreign corporations are receiving less benefits from the United States as compared 
to domestic corporations); Avi-Yonah, Case Against, supra note 249, at 7 (in 
arguing against the United States taxing nonresidents citizens on their worldwide 
income, pointing out that nonresident citizens do not receive certain significant 
benefits that are received by U.S. residents or only receive them in a substantially 
weaker form). 
280. Several commentators agree with this proposition. See supra note 279. 
281. See VanderWolk, Benefits Theory, supra note 252, at 1470 (arguing 
that the taxation of foreign-source business income should be divided more or less 
equally between the residence country and the source country because of the 
governmental services provided by each country); Harris, supra note 137, at 462-63 
(proposing that residents deriving foreign income should be taxed by the residence 
country on their worldwide taxable income at the full residence income tax rate, "but 
should receive a tax credit with respect to their foreign income at the source income 
tax rate," with the source tax rate being lower than the residence tax rate; this will 
result in residents with foreign income contributing to the cost of the "government 
services they receive, i.e., consumption services"); Roin, supra note 184 at 588-89 
(in arguing for a system where the United States exempts foreign income from 
taxation, contending that the government benefits provided by the United States to 
U.S. corporations with respect to foreign income "may be substantial enough to 
justify some home country tax" on such income); cf McLure, supra note 153, at 149 
(finding it more appropriate that the residence country rather than the source country 
should have the right to tax the normal return to capital because "the residence 
country creates the economic climate favorable to the creation of portfolio capital by 
practicing public fiscal virtue and by nourishing private thrift" (quoting from GARY 
CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM 67 (1992)). 
282. See Roin, supra note 184, at 591 ("Exactly the same factors that justify 
the imposition of an add-on tax imposed with respect to the foreign income of a U.S. 
corporation, then, justify a corresponding downward adjustment in the rate of 
corporate tax payable on the domestic income offoreign corporations."). 
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Country A but who derives all of her income from Country B, which has a 
tax rate that exceeds the Country A tax rate, thus precluding any residual tax 
by Country A even if it employed a foreign tax credit system as opposed to 
an exemption system. The individual consumes all of her income in Country 
A, and uses the banking and financial system of Country A to protect the 
wealth that accumulates from the income. Furthermore, the government 
activities of Country A, throu&h its military and state department, protect her 
property rights in Country B.2 3 If the individual's income were sourced only 
on the basis of activities and destination, she would pay no tax to Country A, 
despite the public benefits that she receives from Country A. To prevent this, 
at least a portion of the taxpayer's income should be assigned to Country A 
for primary taxation purposes in order for the taxpayer to shoulder some of 
the burden of Country A governmental costs from which the taxpayer clearly 
benefits. 
As far as the perceived inequity of a country taxing nonresidents less 
heavily than residents (which would occur where a portion of the income is 
sourced to the residence country), residents may well not feel that they are 
being unfairly treated given that nonresidents are receiving fewer benefits -
in particular, a lack of public benefits relating to personal consumption. 
Indeed, an argument can be made that if nonresidents are subject to the same 
taxes as residents despite receiving fewer public benefits from the host 
country, the nonresidents may be the ones who feel that they are being 
treated unfairly. This could result in less compliance by nonresidents as well 
as steps taken to reduce their exposure to source taxation - for example, by 
avoiding a presence in the host country and instead carrying out host country 
activities remotely. 
The difference in benefits provided to residents and nonresidents 
may also mitigate or eliminate any concerns that nonresidents would have an 
advantage in competing with residents in the particular country. A lower 
source tax on nonresidents would only present this concern where .the 
difference in tax burden is not being made up by tax liability in the residence 
country on the portion of the income sourced to it. With substantially 
harmonized source rules (the end-product of this Article's endeavor), there 
would likely be a lack of a significant residence tax only where the residence 
country is not providing important benefits to its individuals and 
corporations, such as stable legal protections.284 In this regard, investors in a 
tax haven corporation would likely have a higher degree of legal risk than 
283. See Roin, supra note 184, at 588-89; Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra 
note 250, at 473. 
284. Cf Roin, supra note 184, at 589 (differences in the tax rates imposed 
by countries often reflect differences in the level of governmental benefits provided) 
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investors in a corporation from a developed country.285 Given this tradeoff, 
nonresidents may well not have a competitive advantage over residents even 
if the nonresidents faced lower overall tax liability?86 Nevertheless, host 
countries could always remove any perceived advantage by subjecting the 
residence country source portion of income to a form of residual source 
taxation - that is, a host country could impose a tax on the entire portion of 
a nonresident's income that is derived from the host country, subject to a 
credit for any residence country taxes that are imposed on the portion of the 
income that is sourced to the residence country.287 
An additional reason for assigning a portion of income to the 
residence country is to have a reasonable allocation of tax jurisdiction that 
can be agreed to by nations on a multilateral basis. Under the destination 
component of the proposed standard, where a taxpayer ·earns income by 
accessing a country's market, a portion of the income should be assigned to 
that country even without the taxpayer's actual presence in the country, 
which is not the case under current law.288 Similarly, the proposed standard 
will assign taxing rights over a portion of interest and royalty income to the 
destination country, thereby altering the typical rights of residence countries 
to tax such income in its entirety.289 These features of the standard thus 
expand the reach of source taxation. Allowing residence countries a primary 
right to tax a portion of income is an appropriate and fair counterbalance to 
these features, and a measure that is more likely to bring about international 
accord on a sourcing standard.290 
285. Cf Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 77 n.l72 (noting that despite 
the clear tax advantages of using a foreign corporation, it is difficult to find examples 
of successful new public firms that have been organized by U.S. entrepreneurs as 
foreign firms). 
286. Cf Roin, supra note 184, at 588-91 (contending that the proposed 
structure, which generally exempts U.S. corporations' foreign income but considers 
the imposition of an add-on tax on such, and considers taxing foreign corporations 
on U.S. income at a lower rate than that applied to the U.S. income of U.S. 
corporations, adheres rather closely to capital export neutrality, with neutrality 
"expanded to include governmental benefits"). 
287. This would be similar to the tax imposed under section 877, under 
which a nonresident alien who is treated as having expatriated to avoid U.S. tax is 
subject to U.S. tax on U.S. source income, as expanded under the provision, but with 
a credit for foreign taxes on income that is taxable solely as a result of section 877. 
See I.R.C. § 877(a), (b), (d). 
288. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 21-22,28 and accompanying text. 
290. Notwithstanding the conceptual basis for residence-based sourcing, 
there is a concern over determining the residence of corporations, which of course is 
necessary in deciding where to source the residence-based portion of income earned 
by corporations. Cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 848 (pointing out that residence-based 
source rules will place tremendous pressure on the residence definition). Under U.S. 
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c. Less Stress on Characterization 
In addition to doing a better job of effectuating the benefits principle, 
the proposed standard would also reduce or possibly eliminate the current 
stress that is placed on characterizing income items for purposes of applying 
source rules. As mentioned previously, under the current source rules, a great 
deal turns on how income is characterized.291 This is because the current 
single source rules result in very different results depending on the type of 
income involved. For example, under the U.S. rules, royalties received on a 
license of a patent are sourced where the patent derives its legal protection,292 
whereas gain on the sale of a patent for a fixed price is sourced where the 
law, corporate residency is based on the country of incorporation. See I.R.C. § 
7701(a)(4), (5). As a consequence, a publicly traded corporation can avoid being 
subject to u.s. tax on its worldwide income, as well as being subject to subpart F on 
foreign income, simply by being incorporated outside the United States. See Shay et 
aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 746-47. This concern has prompted some 
commentators to advocate tests for determining corporate residency that focus on 
what are arguably more meaningful factors than the place of incorporation. See id. at 
749-55 (evaluating alternative tests and concluding that the place of incorporation 
should be retained); Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 76 (stating that the current 
u.S. corporate residence test can be modernized to look to a corporation's "mind and 
management," a U.K. concept). Recently, bills have been proposed in Congress that 
would enact a new section 7701(P), which would treat any large or publicly-traded 
foreign-<>rganized corporation as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax purposes if the 
management and control of the corporation occurs primarily in the United States. See 
International Tax Competitiveness Act of 2011, H.R. 62, 112th Cong.; International 
Tax Competitiveness Act of2010, H.R. 5328, II1th Cong.; see also Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act, H.R. 1265, 111th Congo (2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 
111 th Congo (2009); Jim Brown et aI., New York State Bar Association, Report on 
the Management and Control Provision of the "International Tax Competitiveness 
Act of 2011" (2011) (providing comments on this legislative proposal). While 
determining corporate residency is important in crafting harmonized source rules 
that use residence-based sourcing, this issue will need to be left for a future 
endeavor. For now it may be useful to point out that one basis for sourcing a portion 
of income to the residence country, the legal protections provided by that country, 
may support a corporate residence test that looks to the country of incorporation; 
nevertheless, the fact that a country also provides pubic benefits, such as 
infrastructure, that make possible the domestic management activities of a company 
may also support a residence test that looks to the place of management and control. 
If it is appropriate to focus on factors beyond the place of incorporation, in addition 
to the currently proposed legislation, several alternative tests have been suggested 
for determining corporate residency for purposes of residence taxation. See Shay et 
aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 749-55. 
291. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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seller resides.293 Characterization is particularly problematic in the case of 
transactions involving intangibles and electronic commerce, where the 
income from a given transaction may take the form of royalties, 
compensation, or property gains based on the specific facts and 
circumstances.294 
As a consequence, the current approach often leads to a great deal of 
uncertainty, as well as the potential for double taxation or non-taxation, 
because countries may be characterizing an item differently (even if they 
used similar source rules).295 More fundamentally, the current rules are 
flawed in that they produce different source results for transactions that are 
economically similar.296 This in turn creates planning opportunities for 
taxpayers, with the attendant concerns of manipulation, compliance, and 
enforcement.297 To restate an illustration provided earlier/98 where a U.S. 
resident develops an invention in the United States, obtains a foreign patent 
on the invention, and then sells the foreign patent for a lump sum, all of the 
gain will be U.S. source;299 however, if instead of selling the patent the 
taxpayer licenses the patent in exchange for a lump sum royalty for a period 
that is slightly less than the patent's remaining life, all of the income would 
be foreign source.300 Despite the similarity in the substance of these two 
alternatives, the source results are quite different. 
Under the proposed standard, there would be similar source results 
regardless of how a transaction is characterized. Because the sourcing 
standard calls for rules that would divide the source of income among the 
countries of activities, destination, and residence, economically similar 
transactions would have the same or similar source results. Specifically, in 
the case of an intangible developed by the taxpayer, the standard would 
support a rule that allocates the source of royalty income among the country 
293. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 102. 
295. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
296. See Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade, and Electronic 
Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems, 58 
TAX L. REv. 149, 188 (2005) (pointing out that "the current distinction in the U.S. 
source rules between a sale of a good, a royalty, and a service is highly artificial and 
serves no policy objective;" stating that the current Treasury regulations for sourcing 
income from computer software exemplifies this confusion given that different types 
of transactions involving software are highly substitutable from the developer's point 
of view). 
297. See Noren, supra note 102, at 345 (pointing out that distinguishing e-
commerce income among existing source categories appears to be highly prone to 
manipulation). 
298. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra note 105. 
300. See supra note 106. 
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where the intangible was developed, the country where the intangible is 
being used, and country where the taxpayer resides.301 The same rule should 
be appropriate for gain from the sale of an intangible developed by the 
taxpayer.302 Consequently, the different source results in the example above 
would no longer hold true. 
Because the sourcing standard recognizes the public benefits of the 
different countries involved, and the location of these benefits relates to the 
economic substance of a transaction, rules developed pursuant to the 
standard should produce similar sourcing results for transactions with similar 
economic substance. This would reduce the uncertainty and potential for 
taxpayer manipulation that plague current law. It would also avoid the need 
for harmonized characterization rules for nations, which would be necessary 
if multilateral source rules continued to use a single source approach with 
different rules based on the type of income involved. Although there are 
single source rule options for reducing uncertainty and manipulation, such as' 
residence-based303 or destination-based sourcing304 for all service and 
intangible income, these approaches would be distortive in light of the 
benefits principle and may well not be acceptable internationally.305 
301. See infra notes 370-73 and accompanying text. 
302. See infra notes 374-76 and accompanying text. 
303. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 856. 
304. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 49-50, 57; Noren, supra note 
102, at 345 (suggesting that source rules for e-commerce income focus on the 
location of the consumer in order to avoid the difficult classification issues that arise 
under current law). 
305. See Andrus, supra note 42 at 856. An additional benefit of the 
proposed sourcing standard is that there would generally be less opportunity under 
foreign tax credit limitations for cross--crediting (see supra note 62 and 
accompanying text), given that there would be a greater likelihood that income 
treated as foreign source would be subject to a significant tax by a foreign country. 
For example, under current U.S. law, portfolio income is typically sourced based on 
the destination of capital or property, yet the destination country typically imposes 
little or no tax on most types of such income. See supra notes 17-28 and 
accompanying text. Under the proposed sourcing standard, only a portion of 
portfolio income would be sourced to the country of destination (see supra notes 
267-272 and accompanying text), and the destination country would generally be 
imposing a tax at a significant rate on that portion (see supra note 139-143). 
Consequently, the proposed sourcing standard should reduce the pressure placed on 
the strictness of foreign tax credit limitations. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 
348 (pointing out the inverse relationship between the foreign tax credit basket 
limitations and the restrictiveness of the source rules for U.S. persons); Shay, 
Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 152-53 (same). 
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3. Addressing Administrative and Coordination Concerns 
a. An Allocation Scheme that Avoids Administrative 
Difficulties 
Commentators who agree that the current source rules are arbitrary 
because they typically choose the primary country that provides related 
public benefits, while ignoring other countries that are also providing 
benefits, view the current approach as necessary.306 That is, while in a given 
situation there may be connections to several different countries, an approach 
that attempted to attribute income to each of the countries involved would be 
overly complex and administratively difficult.307 
While taking into account all benefit-providing nations would be 
unworkable, the proposed standard eschews such an approach in favor of one 
that limits the source inquiry to the countries that are likely to provide 
significant public benefits that relate to the income in question. Thus, certain 
less significant connections, such as the residence of the payer or the place 
where payment is made, are ignored because it is administratively impossible 
to allocate income to every country with some connection to the transaction. 
In applying the standard to devise rules, certain additional lines 
should be drawn to promote administrability. For example, service income 
should be sourced without regard to where the taxpayer was educated or 
developed her skills. Although the development of human capital is related 
to earning compensation income and could fall within the activity component 
of the proposed sourcing standard,308 taking this into account appears too 
difficult administratively; moreover, human capital development would 
likely occur at the place where services are performed,309 and under the 
standard a portion of the income will be sourced there in any event. In the 
same vein, source rules devised pursuant to the standard should use 
reasonably certain indicia for the place of activities or destination. For 
example, in determining the destination of goods or services, the rules should 
use well-developed factors such as the "use, consumption, or disposition" 
concept that is currently used under U.S. law.310 Similarly, it would be 
306. See, e.g., Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 20-
2l. 
307. See id. at 20. 
308. Cj Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 140 
(arguing that the country where a service provider'S extensive human capital was 
developed would seem to have a claim to tax a portion of the service income). 
309. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569. 
310. See Reg., § 1.864-6(b)(3)(ii). Nevertheless, with the potential for split 
sourcing of income between activities and destination countries, there will be the 
need for more factual determinations than under current law's single source 
approaches. 
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advisable for the location of taxpayer activities to be limited to those 
jurisdictions where taxpayers engage in significant activities involving 
manufacturing, sales, development, or services that relate to the income in 
question. 
The most important administrative issue with the proposed sourcing 
standard is determining the portions of income that should be assigned to the 
different components. That is, once it is decided that an item of income 
should be divided among the standard's components, what method should be 
used to make the allocation? For many situations, there would not be a 
precise basis for making allocations. For example, it would be nearly 
impossible to value the public benefits provided by the residence country in 
order to determine an allocation for the residence country component, 
assuming that the allocation of income based on the relative amount of 
public benefits provided by jurisdictions is considered appropriate.311 
Likewise, where income is allocated to the destination country because a 
taxpayer has accessed that country's market by selling goods or services into 
the country, the value of the public benefits provided by the destination 
country appears to be indeterminable. In some cases, arm's length pricing 
principles may provide a basis for making allocations, but these principles 
would only be helpful in assigning income to business-related activities and 
transactions. Thus, the arm's length method would not be able to determine 
the portion of portfolio income that should be allocated to a residence 
country, or the appropriate allocation of income between the country of sales 
activities and the country of destination. Yet, some allocation is appropriate 
in light of the public benefits provided at the different locations. 
To address these difficulties, allocations among the components of 
the sourcing standard generally should be made using fixed percentages that 
are mutually agreed upon by countries.3\2 An inexact allocation using fixed 
percentages is the only practical approach for split sourcing where it is not 
possible to determine with any degree of precision the relative value of 
311. In this regard, several leading commentators have expressed their 
opposition to an approach that would partially exempt international income from the 
tax bases of the source and residence countries based on the view that international 
income receives fewer governmental benefits than income earned within a taxing 
country by its residents. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at 
334-37. The commentators object to this approach in part because the approximate 
cost of the government benefits provided by the countries involved is not capable of 
being measured. See id. at 336-37. 
312. The determination of these percentages should generally be made 
based on a rough evaluation of the amount of public benefits provided by the 
residence, activities, and destination countries. However, as mentioned previously, it 
may be appropriate also to take into account equity considerations underlying 
ability-to-pay taxation in determining the portion of the income that is sourced to the 
country of residence. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
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government benefits provided by countries. And such an approach is superior 
to no allocation at all because it at least recognizes that more than one 
country is providing significant government benefits that relate to the 
income.313 As an illustration of this approach, countries may decide that 
service income should be allocated by assigning one third of the income to 
each of the countries where the services are performed, where the services 
are used or consumed, and where the taxpayer resides.314 
The use of fixed percentage allocations to source income has support 
under current law. For income that is attributable to transportation that either 
begins or ends in the United States, the current U.S. rules treat 50 percent of 
the gross income as U.S. source and 50 percent as foreign source.315 The U.S. 
rules also use a 50-50 method to source international communications 
income that is earned by U.S. persons.316 Similarly, income from the 
manufacture and sale of inventory is generally sourced by allocating 50 
percent of income to the place of manufacturing and 50 percent of the 
income to the place of sales.317 Furthermore, the apportionment formulas 
used by U.S. states provide analogous support for using fixed percentages in 
sourcing income. These formulas typically apportion income among states 
by using fixed percentage factors - for example, an equally weighted three-
factor formula that takes into account the location of sales, payroll costs, and 
assets.318 Recently, some commentators have proposed using similar formula 
apportionment schemes in lieu of transfer pricing to allocate income among 
affiliated corporations.319 These measures reflect a judgment that where more 
precise allocations are unavailable or too difficult, a reasonable allocation of 
tax jurisdiction based on fixed percentages is superior to no allocation 
whatsoever. 
As alluded to above, it would be appropriate to use arm's length 
pricing principles to allocate income within the activities component. For 
example, in lieu of the 50-50 method generally used under U.S. law to 
313. Moreover, an inexact method of allocating income should not be 
viewed as inappropriate given that the benefits principle's equity basis for sourcing 
is somewhat imprecise in light of the value judgments involved. See supra notes 
155-157, 182 and accompanying text. 
314. Cf Bell, supra note 270 (Indian official quoted as stating that giving 
the residence and source countries the rights to tax one half of certain income that 
originates in India "would be an amicable resolution of the problem"). 
315. See I.R.C. § 863(c). 
316. See I.R.C. § 863(e). 
317. See Reg. § l.863-3. 
318. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Legis/ative, Judicia/, Soft Law, and 
Cooperative Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the 
EO, 14 COLUM. 1. EUR. L. 377, 420-21 (2008) (describing the formulary methods 
used by U.S. states to apportion business income). 
319. See, e.g., Avi-Y onah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 136. 
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allocate income between manufacturing activities and sales activities, it 
would be advisable to base such allocations on the ann's length method.320 
This would allow for a determination that takes into account the economic 
income attributable to these activities, which should serve as a reasonable 
proxy for the relative amount of government benefits provided at these 
locations. The use of arm's length principles to allocate income among a 
taxpayer's activities would also promote the neutral treatment of activities 
conducted through branches and subsidiaries, given the use of the arm's 
length method to allocate income where activities are conducted through 
affiliated corporations.321 For the same reasons, it would be appropriate to 
use arm's length principles to allocate income within the activities 
component in other situations, such as in the case of global dealing 
operations involving financial products.322 The use of ann's length principles 
in these and other similar situations is generally consistent with the 
functional separate entity method that is authorized by the OECD model 
treaty as well as by some recent U.S. treaties.323 
In theory, arm's length principles can also be used in certain 
situations to allocate income between the activities component and the 
destination component of the sourcing standard. For example, where a bank 
incorporated in Country A makes a loan to a resident of Country B, with all 
of the loan activities done at a branch located in Country C, it may be 
possible to divide the interest income received by the bank between the 
activities and destination components by determining an arm's length charge 
for the banking services performed by the Country C branch. This may 
provide an economically justifiable way of determining the portion of the 
interest that represents compensation for the banking services and the portion 
that represents compensation for the use of money. (A portion would still 
need to be assigned to Country A, the residence country). However, a 
320. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 29-33 (recommending that the 
source of income from the production and sale of tangible personal property be 
determined by apportioning the income between the countries of production 
activities and sales activities using arm's length principles). 
321. See Fred B. Brown, Federal Income Taxation of us. Branches of 
Foreign Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAX L. REv. 133, 
193-95 (1993); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 33. Nevertheless, the results under 
the sourcing standard for subsidiary versus branch operations will differ where 
parent and subsidiary corporations have different residences, in light of the residence 
component of the standard. 
322. Proposed Treasury regulations are in accord with this approach. See 
Prop. Reg. § 1.482-8. 
323. See, e.g., OEeD Model, supra note 15, at art. 7; U.S. Model, supra 
note 22, at art. 7. Unlike the treaty separate entity method, however, the proposed 
standard would source a portion of the income based on the residence of the 
taxpayer. 
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problem with using arm's length principles to make this allocation is that 
since the interest would be received over time, it would be necessary to 
apportion each payment of interest between the banking services element and 
use of money element, which would require the use of present value concepts 
to achieve a degree of accuracy. Moreover, given the uncertainty in 
determining an arm's length charge for the banking services at the Country C 
branch, using this method would severely complicate the application of a 
withholding tax on the interest in Country B, although procedures could be 
created that would allow the bank to claim a refund for over-withholding by 
demonstrating the amount of interest that is properly assignable to the 
Country C banking branch.324 
Even more troublesome would be using arm's length principles to 
allocate royalty income between a taxpayer's development activities in one 
country and the use of the intangible in another country. In theory, such 
income could be economically divided by determining the value of the 
intangible and then using this value to allocate the royalties between the 
portion that represents a return of the value of the intellectual property and 
the portion that represents a return on the intellectual property.325 However, 
in addition to the problems discussed above, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in valuing intangibles.326 Moreover, even after determining the 
value of the intangible, in the case of contingent royalties there would be the 
added difficulties of determining the extent to which the royalties represent a 
return of this value, given that the time period that the intangible would be 
productive can only be roughly estimated and the annual royalties will 
typically vary over the life of the intangible.327 Because of these problems, 
the American Law Institute decided to forgo any allocation to the place of 
development activities, and instead source royalties in their entirety to the 
location where the intangible is used.328 Without delving into the details, 
other commentators, however, appear to suggest that an allocation between 
the locations where an intangible is developed and used should at least be 
considered.329 
Because of these difficulties, fixed percentages should be used to 
allocate income between the activities and destination components of the 
sourcing standard, with the particular percentages determined by 
324. Cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 36 (discussing similar 
administrative problems with an approach that would use arm's length principles to 
divide the source of income from the production and lease of tangible property). 
325. See id. at 48. 
326. See id. at 49; See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 243. 
327. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 243. 
328. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 48-49. A leading commentator 
on international taxation also came to the same conclusion. See Lokken, Intellectual 
Property, supra note 57, at 242-43. 
329. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 143. 
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international agreement. The same approach should be used for other 
activities-destination allocations. The use of arm's length principles for this 
purpose is too difficult administratively, but an allocation is warranted in 
light of the government benefits received in each location. Thus, as stated 
previously, where other methods are not available, a reasonable, fixed 
percentage allocation is superior to no allocation at all. And the fact that the 
percentages would need to be agreed upon internationally should ensure that 
they are reasonable.330 
b. Market Access and Enforcement Concerns 
Where a nonresident generates income by accessing the market of 
another country, a portion of the income should in principle be sourced to 
this country under the destination component of the sourcing standard due to 
the governmental benefits provided to the taxpayer by the country whose 
market is penetrated.331 Thus, where a wholesaler who resides in one country 
sells goods from a branch in that country to an independent retailer located in 
another country, the destination country should have the right to tax the 
wholesaler on a portion of the income on the sale. And it should be feasible 
for the destination country to collect the tax by requiring the retailer to 
withhold. However, if the sale by the nonresident seller were directly to 
consumers in the destination country through electronic commerce or other 
remote selling techniques, the collection of the tax would be more 
problematic, given that consumers may not be reliable withholding agents.332 
While there may be ways to create an enforcement structure for these 
situations,333 the important point is that in devising source rules, the 
allocation of income under the destination component would be dependent 
on addressing enforcement concerns for taxing electronic commerce and 
other types of remote selling. 
330. While this Article does not address the subject of sourcing deductions 
(see supra note 16), it should be noted that the proposed approach's potential for 
split sourcing of income items will further complicate the allocation and 
apportionment of deductions to income from different sources. This should not be 
overly burdensome for taxpayers and tax authorities, as deductions allocated to split 
sourced income could be apportioned to the income from different sources based on 
the relative amounts of such income. Cf Reg. § 1.863-3(d) (using this method to 
allocate and apportion deductions to income from the manufacture of sale of 
inventory where the 50-50 method is used to determine the source of such income). 
331. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text. 
332. See Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1053 & n.264. 
333. See infra note 364. 
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c. The Need/or International Agreement 
That there be substantial international agreement on the sourcing 
standard and the rules developed thereunder is critical to the success of this 
Article's endeavor.334 In the absence of such agreement, there would likely 
be an unacceptable amount of double taxation and non-taxation. This is 
because the proposed split sourcing approach is inconsistent with the current 
single source approaches that are typically used by countries. Thus, if some 
countries use the proposed standard to devise source rules, but many other 
countries did not, there would be a great amount of inconsistency in the 
source rules used by nations - probably considerably more so than under 
current law.335 
This Article recommends that the United States should take the lead 
in advocating the international acceptance of the proposed sourcing 
standard.336 The key would be having the support of the OECD,337 which 
could then work to turn the sourcing standard into source rules that can be 
adopted by at least a substantial majority of countries.338 
International agreement may well be attainable. In particular, it is 
certainly possible that countries could agree to share tax jurisdiction by 
agreeing to the fixed percentages that would generally be used to allocate 
income among the activities, destination, and residence countries. The fact 
334. Cf OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 25 (stressing the need for 
universal agreement on rules for allocating taxing rights over business profits in 
order to prevent double taxation or non-taxation). 
335. Cf Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at 339 
(pointing out that the unilateral adoption of an approach that fractionally apportioned 
international income between the source and residence countries would result in 
double taxation probably being over- or under-mitigated in most cases). 
336. This would be similar to the United States having taken the lead in 
promoting the international adoption of the arm's length method for allocating 
income among commonly controlled corporations. See Barbara Angus, Tom Neubig, 
Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, The U.S. International Tax System At a 
Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 64 (2010). 
337. Cf Graetz, Multilateral Solution, supra note 84, at 493 (suggesting 
that the OECD and European Commission might lead the way in achieving a 
multilateral agreement for the treatment of interest expense that is based on 
worldwide allocation). 
338. Cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary 
Apportionment - Myths and Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax Policy 
by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative 26 
(Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 221, 
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693105 (claiming that for a hybrid arm's-
length/formulary apportionment regime to be operative, it would be sufficient if a 
"critical mass of countries that includes some major developed and emerging 
economies [ adopts] such a regime"). 
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that countries entering into tax treaties typically use identical provisions to 
reduce or eliminate source taxation on passive income demonstrates that 
such agreement is possible.339 And beyond the split-sourcing aspect of the 
standard, the proposed approach is not at all radical: rather than introducing a 
new basis for allocating tax jurisdiction, the standard unifies into a split-
sourcing approach the concepts that are currently used separately in single 
source rules?40 
IV. USING THE STANDARD TO DEVISE SOURCE RULES 
This part uses the standard developed in the preceding part to 
suggest source rules for several types of income. The objective here is not to 
propose a comprehensive and detailed set of source rules that should be 
adopted on a multilateral basis. Instead, it is to illustrate how the standard 
can be used to formulate certain source rules in order to provide a foundation 
for future efforts in this area. 
339. See supra notes 22-23, 28 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra Part III.C.2. International agreement on this Article's 
sourcing approach should be considerably less difficult than the multilateral adoption 
of formulary apportionment to allocate tax jurisdiction over the income of related 
multi-national corporations, a concept advocated recently by several notable 
commentators (see supra note 136). First, unlike the proposed sourcing approach, 
many nations may be quite reluctant to adopt formulary apportionment in lieu of 
arm's-length transfer pricing, given the lack of experience with large-scale 
formulary apportionment and the unknowns that it presents. See Kleinbard, Lessons, 
supra note 84, at 66 (referring to the susceptibility of formulary apportionment to 
gaming as an important unknown; concluding that "[i]t is difficult to imagine how a 
multilateral global formulary apportionment system can come to pass"). Second, as 
compared to the adoption of uniform source rules, multilateral agreement on 
territorial taxation with formulary apportionment would involve greater tax stakes in 
that countries would exercise tax jurisdiction only over that income that is 
apportioned to them pursuant to the formula; with uniform source rules, countries 
would still have the option of exercising residual tax jurisdiction over their residents 
via foreign tax credit systems, as well as retain the ability to employ mechanisms 
designed to prevent their residents from avoiding current taxes on certain income 
that is allocated to tax haven corporations (see supra note 139). With lower tax 
stakes, international agreement on source rules should be more feasible. Finally, a 
multilateral formulary apportionment system would require agreement on not only 
apportionment factors, but also on the tax base that would be subject to 
apportionment, the latter appearing quite unlikely given the differences in countries' 
tax bases and the value that countries attach to their particular tax regimes. See A vi-
Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 338, at 15 (stating that "any attempt to form a 
comprehensive corporate tax base in the near future suffers from high failure 
probabilities"). Harmonized source rules would not require multilateral agreement 
on a common tax base. 
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To recap, under the sourcing standard, the source of income should 
be evaluated on the basis of three factors: the destination of the services, 
property, or capital giving rise to income; the location(s) of the activities 
giving rise to income; and the residence of the person receiving income. 
Based on this evaluation, a given item of income may have its source divided 
among multiple locations. Below this standard is applied to suggest source 
rules for the following types of income: interest, dividends and stock 
gains/41 service income, income from intangibles, and inventory income.342 
A. Interest 
In using the standard to devise source rules for interest income, there 
should be separate treatment for interest received by passive investors and 
interest received by active lenders, such as banks and other financial 
businesses. For passive investors, the source of interest income should be 
341. Source rules developed pursuant to the standard would also need to 
address income from financial derivatives such as interest rate and equity swaps. 
One commentator has argued that because of the difficulty in subjecting equity 
swaps to U.S. source taxation, the United States should consider exempting U.S. 
source portfolio dividends (and perhaps all other U.S. source non-business income) 
earned by foreign persons from treaty countries. See Colon, supra note 146, at 780. 
Recently, Congress has gone in the opposite direction, and enacted a provision that 
sources payments pursuant to equity swaps involving U.S. source dividends (and 
other dividend equivalents involving U.S. source dividends) as if they were actual 
U.S. source dividends. See I.R.C. § 871(m). 
342. As mentioned previously, since it is contemplated that there will be 
multilateral agreement on source via harmonized domestic rules, treaties would not 
generally alter the taxing rights of countries, although treaties may still affect to 
some degree the tax rates that apply to particular types of income. See supra 143 and 
accompanying text. With regard to the permanent establishment threshold for 
subjecting business income to source taxation, for administrative reasons it may be 
advisable to modify the threshold rather than eliminate it entirely. The current 
threshold, which relies on physical presence (see supra notes 37-38 and 
accompanying text), should not be used; it would prevent source taxation of income 
from remote activities that would be sourced to the destination country pursuant to 
the proposed sourcing standard. However, subjecting remote sellers or service 
providers to the tax jurisdiction of destination countries in all situations could be 
administratively burdensome for taxpayers and tax authorities. Accordingly, it may 
be sensible to retain the permanent establishment threshold, but modify it so that a 
taxpayer would not be subject to source taxation on business income where there are 
a de minimis amount of sales into a country. Other commentators have made similar 
recommendations. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 231, at 1671. Of 
course, modifying the permanent establishment threshold to remove the physical 
presence requirement raises enforcement concerns in taxing remote sellers and the 
like, which would need to be addressed in devising source rules. See supra Part 
II1.C.3.b. 
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divided between the residence country of the interest recipient and the 
destination country of the funds that are loaned. Because a passive investor 
will have performed minimal activities in making the loan, none of the 
interest should be sourced under the activities component of the standard. 
The division of the interest income between the residence and destination 
countries should be based on a fixed percentage that is agreed to 
internationally. 
There are several possibilities for determining the destination of the 
loaned funds, considering the public benefits that relate to the interest 
income. One option would be to source the destination component according 
to the residence of the borrower. This is based on the view that the 
borrower's country of residence is presumably where the borrower derives 
the income or wealth that fund the interest payments, and that the public 
benefits provided by this country thus indirectly benefit the interest 
recipient.343 A more refined approach in this regard would be to focus on 
specific factors that indicate the location of the borrower's economic 
activities; for this ~urpose, the relevant activities could be those of the 
borrower in general 44 or those that relate to funding the particular interest 
payments.345 A third option would be to combine the first two options: the 
destination of the loaned funds would presumptively be the residence of the 
borrower unless there are clear indicia that the borrower was conducting 
relevant economic activities at another location. This third option appears the 
most appropriate as it strikes a reasonable balance between the benefits 
principle and administrabilty. It is also similar to the approach under current 
343. Cf Lokken, Source, supra note 49, at 28 (stating that under a benefits-
based model for sourcing income, "interest originates where the borrower utilizes the 
borrowed funds because governmental services and protections at that location are 
central to the success of the borrower's venture, which generates the capacity to pay 
interest on the loan;" concluding that the current source rule for interest, which 
generally assigns all interest income to the obligor's country of residence, is 
probably the best available approximation given the practical difficulties of a more 
refined approach and the fact that most obligors locate their activities and 
investments predominantly in their countries of residence); ALI PROJECT I, supra 
note 14, at 67-68 (stating that the general principle underlying the source rules for 
interest appears to be that interest should be sourced in the country that is reasonably 
presumed to be the place where the borrower derives the income or wealth from 
which the interest is paid; stating that a fair presumption is that in most cases the 
borrower's country of residence or domicile is where the borrower's economic 
interests are centered). 
344. Cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 68 (pointing out that in certain 
circumstances, current U.S. law disregards the borrower's residence or domicile and 
sources interest based on the geographic composition of the borrower's income). 
345. Cf id. at 69-70 (recommending an approach for sourcing interest that 
in part focuses on the location of real estate or a business that the interest relates to). 
2011J Sourcing Income Among Nations 633 
U.S. law,346 except that the U.S. rule applies to source the entire amount of 
interest, as opposed to just the destination component. 
Where the interest recipient is a bank or other financial entity, the 
source results should be the same as above except that a portion of the 
interest income would also be assigned to the country (or countries) where 
the taxpayer conducts significant activities that relate to the lending 
transaction. As discussed previously, the portion sourced to the activities 
component should be based on a fixed percentage agreed to internationally. 
This portion may be further apportioned between two or more countries 
where significant activities related to the transaction occur at multiple 
countries; such apportionment could be done either based on the ratio of 
arm's length charges for the lending activities at the different locations or by 
using fixed percentages. 
B. Income from Corporate Stock 
1. Dividends 
Dividend income should be sourced in a manner that is similar to the 
sourcing of interest income. That is, for passive investors a portion of the 
dividends should be allocated to the shareholder's residence country and a 
portion should be allocated to the destination country of the invested capital, 
with the portions determined on the basis of a fixed percentage. As with 
interest received by passive investors, none of the dividend income should be 
sourced based on the activities component of the standard; this is because the 
shareholder's activities in connection with earning the dividends are likely to 
be minimal. 
Similar to sourcing interest income, there are several options in 
determining the destination country of the shareholder's invested capital. 
One possibility would be to look to the country of incorporation based on the 
view that this country is providing the shareholder with public benefits 
through its legal system that protects and regulates the shareholder's 
investment in the corporation.347 Alternatively, the destination country could 
be considered the country or countries where the corporation is engaged in 
significant business activities.348 This is because such countries provide 
346. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
347. Cj ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 62-63 (stating that the traditional 
rule, which sources dividends to the country of the distributing corporation's 
domicile, gives controlling weight to the fact that the distributing corporation derives 
its legal capacity from its country of domicile). 
348. Cj id. at 63 (referring to this approach as alternative way of sourcing 
dividends). Whether activities in a country are considered significant for this purpose 
could be based on a certain threshold percentage of the corporation's gross income. 
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B) (using a threshold of 25 percent of a foreign 
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public benefits that relate to the corporate earnings that in turn are the 
economic source of the dividends;349 in other words, the countries where the 
corporation conducts activities provide indirect public benefits to the 
shareholders. A third option would be to take into account both the 
corporation's country of incorporation and significant activities countries by 
apportioning the destination portion of the dividend among these countries; if 
this is done, a fixed percentage should be used for this purpose. If all or a 
portion of the destination portion of the dividend is sourced according to the 
location of the corporation's significant business activities, it would be 
advisable to base this determination on the composition by source of the 
., • 350 
corporatIon s gross lDcome. 
Determining the source of dividend income based on the income 
composition of a corporation raises comelications in imposing a source tax 
that is collected through withholding.3 I For this reason,352 in lieu of a 
secondary dividend tax, the United States and some other countries exact a 
second level of tax on the domestic earnings of foreign corporations by 
imposing a branch profits tax on such corporations.353 Assuming that the 
destination portion of dividends will not be sourced exclusively on the basis 
of the corporation's country of incorporation, countries should continue to 
have the option of using a branch profits tax as a surrogate for taxing a 
portion of dividends. 
Where the dividend recipient is a securities dealer or otherwise 
holding corporate stock in the conduct of an active business, it seems 
appropriate to modify the source results by assigning a portion of the 
dividend to the country (or countries) where the taxpayer conducts 
significant activities that relate to the acquisition of the stock. If this is done, 
corporation's gross income being U.S. effectively connected income to determine 
whether a portion of dividends paid by the corporation is sourced to the United 
States). 
349. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 63; Lokken, Source, supra note 
49, at 27. 
350. To illustrate, if the third option were used, a fixed percentage of the 
destination portion of the dividend would be assigned to both the corporation's 
country of incorporation and the country (or countries) where the corporation 
conducts economic activities; where the corporation has significant activities in more 
than one country, the latter portion would be further apportioned according to the 
percentages of corporate income derived from each country. 
351. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 1036-37; ALI PROJECT I, 
supra note 14, at 141; Fred B. Brown, Reforming the Branch Profits Tax to Achieve 
Neutrality, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1219, 1225 (2006) [hereinafter Brown, Branch Profits 
Tax]. 
352. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 1037; Brown, Branch Profits 
Tax, supra note 351, at 1225. 
353. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 884; see also Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 516-
17. 
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the portion sourced to the activities component should be based on a fixed 
percentage agreed to internationally. This portion may be further apportioned 
between two or more countries where significant activities related to the 
transaction occur at multiple countries; such apportionment could be done 
either based on the ratio of arm's length charges for the activities at the 
different locations or by using fixed percentages. 
2. Stock Gains 
The gain on the sale of stock by Eassive investors should be sourced 
in the same way as dividend income. 54 Economically, a stock gain is 
essentially a market capitalization of a corporation's future earnings.355 
Consequently, the same reasons that support the rights of the residence and 
destination countries to tax portions of the dividend should apply with equal 
force to stock gains.356 In particular, the country or countries where the 
corporation is incorporated and/or doing business are providing the selling 
shareholder with important public benefits that contribute to the value of the 
stock investment, both directly through legal protection and indirectly 
through benefits provided to the corporation. While current law usually 
sources stock gains realized by investors exclusively to the taxpayer's 
country of residence/57 this treatment appears to be mainly due to perceived 
administrative and enforcement concerns of imposing a source tax on such 
gains.358 As has been pointed out by other commentators, these concerns can 
be addressed by applying withholding procedures similar to those that apply 
under U.S. law for taxing foreign persons on sales of stock in U.S. real 
property holding corporations.359 
C. Service Income 
Income received for performing services should be sourced by 
dividing the income among the country where the service provider resides, 
the country ( or countries) where the services are performed, and the country 
where the services are either used or consumed. Fixed percentages should be 
used for making these allocations. Where services are performed in more 
354. Stock gains realized by dealers should be sourced according to the 
rules for inventory. See infra Part IV.E. 
355. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122. 
356. Id. (stating that if the market access rationale supports a source tax on 
dividends, it should also support a source tax on stock gains). 
357. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
358. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122. 
359. See Cynthia Blum, How the United States Should Tax Foreign 
Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REv. 583, 643-51 (1988); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source 
Rules, supra note 1, at 145. 
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than one country, the place of performance portion should be further 
apportioned between two or more countries based on either the time spent or 
payroll costs incurred in each of the countries in performing the services. 
Under this rule, where services are performed in one country for use or 
consumption in another country, both countries, in addition to the service 
provider's country of residence, would have the primary right to tax a portion 
of the income. While current U.S. law focuses exclusively on where the 
services are performed, some countries use a destination approach for 
sourcing service income/6o and a few commentators view market access as a 
justification for imposing a source tax on services performed remotely.361 
Indeed, a recent article emphasizes that the continued reliance on a service 
provider's physical presence in sourcing service income will become 
increasing~ untenable with the prevalence of remote services in the modern 
economy.3 2 While not inconsistent with these views, this Article calls for an 
approach that divides the source of service income in recognition of the 
public benefits provided at each of the relevant locations. 
An important caveat to the suggested rule for sourcing service 
income is the ability of the destination country to enforce a source tax on 
services performed remotely. While withholding by the service recipient 
should be feasible where the recipient is a business, difficulties will be 
encountered where services are rendered remotely to a broad range of 
individual consumers, such as in the case of electronic commerce.363 
Enforcement mechanisms must be developed before the implementation of a 
rule that sources a portion of service income to the destination of remotely 
performed consumer services. In this regard, commentators have suggested 
possible enforcement structures for taxing electronic commerce.364 
360. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
361. See Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 537-40; 
Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1040-41 & n.211, 1066. In a similar vein, 
another commentator has proposed a market state approach to the sourcing of service 
receipts for dividing the business income of multi state enterprises under unITPA 
for state corporate income tax purposes. See John A. Swain, Reforming the State 
Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Approach to the Sourcing of Service 
Receipts, 83 TuL. L. REv. 285, 346-53 (2008). 
362. See Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1073. 
363. See id. at 1053. 
364. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 145-46 
(stating that because electronic commerce involves "credit or debit charges, or 
electronic cash payment facilities, it may be possible to rely on these payors in some 
fashion to structure a viable enforcement mechanism in the future"); A vi-Y onah, 
Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 537-38 (proposing a gross withholding tax 
that would be imposed "by the Demand Jurisdiction unilaterally by forbidding 
merchants from selling goods to its residents unless procedures for withholding the 
tax are in place"). 
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D. Income from Intangibles 
I. Royalties 
In using the standard to devise a source rule for royalties, it is 
important to distinguish between situations where the taxpayer purchased the 
intangible that is licensed and where the taxpayer developed the licensed 
intangible. In the former situation, the source of royalty income should be 
divided between the licensor's country of residence and the country where 
the intangible is used. This assumes that the taxpayer is not engaged in an 
active business of licensing intangibles, and thus none of the royalty income 
should be sourced based on the activities component of the standard because 
the taxpayer's activities would seem to be relatively insignificant to the 
economics of the transaction.365 If the transaction occurs in the active 
conduct of a licensing business, it should be appropriate to allocate a portion 
of the royalties to the country or countries where the licensing activities take 
place.366 As in other situations, the division of the royalty income should be 
based on fixed percentages. 
The place of use should typically be the country that provides the 
legal protections that relate to the intangible.367 This country should have the 
right to tax a portion of the royalties because through its laws and legal 
system the destination country provides the taxpayer with the public benefits 
that permit the earning of the royalty income.368 The destination country also 
provides the taxpayer with indirect benefits that relate to the royalty income 
by providing public benefits to the taxpayer's licensee that contribute to the 
licensee's ability to earn income that is typically shared with the licensor via 
contingent royalty payments.369 
365. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Lokken, Intellectual 
Property, supra note 57, at 240. 
366. Current U.S. law provides some support for sourcing a portion of 
royalties to the place where a taxpayer performs significant licensing activities in 
connection with an active business. Under section 864(c), foreign source royalties 
received by a foreign person are subject to U.S. net basis taxation where the royalties 
are derived in the active conduct of a U.S. business and attributable to the foreign 
person's U.S. office. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(A) and (B), (c)(5). Of course, under this 
provision, the United States has tax jurisdiction over the entire amount of the 
royalties, not just a portion. 
367. See Shay et aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 773. As under current 
law, complications would arise in determining the place of use where the intangible 
provides protection in more than one country. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 
50-52; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 277-86. 
368. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Lokken, Intellectual 
Property, supra note 57, at 240-41. 
369. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45 
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Where the taxpayer developed the licensed intangible, the source of 
the royalty income should be divided among the taxpayer's country of 
residence, the country (or possibly countries37!) where significant 
development activities took place, and the country where the intangible is 
used; again, fixed percentages should be used to divide the income.371 The 
country where significant development activities occur provides important 
public benefits in support of such activities and thus should have the right to 
tax a portion of the royalty income.372 And using a fixed percentage to assign 
a portion of the royalties to the development country should remove the 
administrative concerns regarding such allocations that have been voiced by 
commentators.373 While this allocation approach is imprecise, it is superior to 
ignoring the development country in assigning source in light of the public 
benefits provided there. 
2. Intangible Gains 
Gain on the sale of an intangible should be sourced in the same 
manner as royalties.374 Thus, for purchased intangibles, the source of the gain 
should be divided between the taxpayer's country of residence and the 
country where the intangible will be used; for developed intangibles, the 
370. Where the taxpayer conducts significant development activities in two 
or more countries, it may be advisable to further apportion the portion of the 
royalties assigned to development activities; this should probably be done using 
fixed percentages because of difficulties in valuing the relative contributions of 
different development activities. 
371. This assumes that the licensing transaction is not in connection with an 
active business. If it were, it would be appropriate to source a portion of the royalties 
to the location of the licensing activities. See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
372. See supra note 234 and accompanying text; cf Lokken, Intellectual 
Property, supra note 57, at 242 (acknowledging that with regard to royalty income 
received from the license of intangible property developed by the taxpayer, both the 
country that was the situs of development activities and the country where the 
intangible is used provide important services and protections). 
373. In this regard, commentators have recognized the conceptual basis for 
dividing the source of such royalty income between the country of development and 
country of use, but declined to do so mainly for administrative reasons. See ALI 
PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 48; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 
242-43. 
374. Other commentators have also proposed using the same rule to source 
both royalties and intangible gains. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 47-50; 
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 244. Unlike the proposal here, these 
commentators would use the place of use rule to source both items. See id. Under 
current U.s. law, intangible gains are sourced the same as royalties only where the 
gains are contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the intangible. See 
I.R.C. § 865(d)(I). 
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source of the gain should be divided among the taxpayer's country of 
residence, the country (or possibly countries375) where the development 
activities took place, and the country where the intangible will be used.376 
Again, fixed percentages should be used to divide the income. 
The same reasons that support this approach for royalties also apply 
with respect to intangible gains. A taxpayer who realizes gain on the sale of 
an intangible receives public benefits from the country from which the 
intangible derives its legal protection; without this protection, which is a 
product of the laws and legal system of the country providing it, the 
intangible would lack value and the gain would not be realized.377 And where 
the taxpayer has developed the intangible, whether the intangible is licensed 
or sold, the country where significant development activities take place 
provides imf.0rtant public benefits that relate to the taxpayer's ability to earn 
the income. 78 An additional reason for applying the same source rule for 
royalties and intangible gains is that this approach will avoid the difficult 
issue of determining whether a transfer of an intangible should be 
characterized as a license or a sale.379 Indeed, with the proposed rule for 
service income, the same or similar source rules would apply to royalties, 
intangible gains, and service income, Pcutting considerably less stress on 
property/service characterization issues.3 0 
375. See supra note 370. 
376. This assumes that the sales transaction is not in connection with an 
active business. If it were, it would be appropriate to source a portion of the gain to 
the location ofthe sales activities. 
377. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 244 (in proposing 
that intangible gains should be sourced based on where the intangible will be used, 
pointing out the importance of the services and protections provided by the country 
in which the intangible is exploited). 
378. See id. (in considering but ultimately rejecting an approach dividing 
intangible gain between the country of development and country of the sale, noting 
that the services and protections provided by the country that is the location of 
development activities can be viewed as significant factors in creating the 
intangible). 
379. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 47. 
380. Cf id. at 53-57 (discussing these difficulties). In this regard, the 
Treasury has issued regulations that attempt to address these characterization issues 
in the context of transactions involving computer programs. See Reg. § 1.861-18. 
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E. Income from the Sale of Inventory 
In using the standard to devise a source rule for income from the sale 
of inventory, it is important to distinguish between situations where the 
taxpayer purchased the inventory and where the taxpayer produced the 
inventory. For purchased inventory, the source of the inventory income 
should be divided among the taxpayer's country of residence, the country or 
countries where significant sales activities take place, and the country in 
which the inventory is used or consumed. Fixed percentages should be used 
to divide the income. The portion assigned to the location of sales activities 
should be further apportioned between two or more countries where 
significant sales activities related to the transaction occur in multiple 
countries;381 such apportionment should probably be done based on the ratio 
of arm's length charges for the activities at the different locations, although 
the use of fixed percentages may be an acceptable alternative. This source 
rule recognizes the related public benefits provided to the taxpayer by each 
of the residence, activities, and destination countries?82 
Where the taxpayer produced the inventory, the source of the 
inventory income should be divided among the taxpayer's country of 
residence, the country (or countries) where significant production activities 
take place, the country (or countries) where significant sales activities take 
place, and the country in which the inventory is used or consumed. In this 
situation, portions of the inventory income would be assigned to two 
different types of activities - production and sales. Fixed percentages 
should be used to allocate the inventory income among the three categories 
of countries: that is, a certain percentage of the income should be assigned to 
the residence country, a certain percentage of the income should be assigned 
to the destination country, and a certain percentage of the income should be 
assigned to the countries where production and sales activities occur. It 
would then be necessary to further divide the portion of the income assigned 
to production and sales activities. As mentioned previously, it would be 
381. This can occur where one branch is performing a wholesaling function 
and another is performing a retail selling function; it can also occur where the 
taxpayer is either a wholesaler or a retailer, but different functions are performed at 
different branches - for example, storage and shipping at one branch with 
solicitation and negotiation at another branch. 
382. In this regard, the American Law Institute found that it may be 
appropriate for inventory income to be sourced in either the activities country or the 
destination country in light of the related public benefits provided by each of these 
countries. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 20. Ultimately, the All settled on a 
recommended rule that focuses primarily on the country where the sales activities 
take place, but gives weight to the destination country in certain situations. See id. at 
23. 
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advisable to do so based on the ratio of arm's length charges for the 
production and sales activities.383 
As previously discussed,384 the destination country should have the 
right to tax a portion of the inventory income because the taxpayer accesses 
this country's market by selling goods to consumers and businesses located 
therein. Since a country's market is in large part a product of government 
activities, the destination country is providing the taxpayer with important 
public benefits that justify source taxation. And this holds true even when the 
taxpayer has no physical presence in the destination country. Nevertheless, it 
may be difficult for the destination country to enforce a source tax where 
goods are sold remotely to individual consumers, such as in the case of 
electronic commerce. Consequently, as with remote services, applying the 
destination component of the source rule to remote sales of consumer goods 
would need to be conditioned on the creation of adequate mechanisms for 
enforcing a source taX.385 
v. CONCLUSION 
The current source of income rules used in the United States and 
other countries are crucial to the functioning of the international tax rules 
because they essentially establish the contours of tax jurisdiction that is 
exercised by countries. However, the current approach for sourcing income 
suffers from a lack of coherence and international conformity. This Article 
addresses both of these problems by offering an equity-based approach for -
sourcing income that has the potential for being adopted by countries on a 
multilateral basis. By basing the source rules on a benefits principle-based 
standard that allows income source to be divided when appropriate, this 
Article seeks to rationalize and harmonize the provisions used to source 
income for purposes of taxing cross-border investment and business 
activities. 
383. Where production activities occur at more than one location, the 
portion assigned to production activities should be further divided. An asset-based 
apportionment method could be used for this purpose. See Reg. § 1.863-3(c) 
(employing this approach under current U.S. law). 
384. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text. 
385. See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
